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ABSTRACT 
In 2003, Renata Oliveira, a young Portuguese architect, has re-discovered the Point of Corumbau 
in Bahia, Brazil, and, like the Portuguese adventurers who had discovered Brazil 500 years earlier 
in the same location, found it to be an area that is wild, beautiful and undeveloped.  It is also 
sitting right at the edge of perhaps the most promising resort and second home real estate market 
in the world: the Northeast coast of Brazil.  The case challenges students to conduct market and 
project feasibility analysis in an emerging market environment, with data and contextual 
information supplied in the case.  It considers the effectiveness of such analysis, and raises 
questions about the usefulness of time-series data in markets that are changing in fundamental 
ways, the importance of macro- and international economics in weighing real estate investments, 
the methods available for evaluating emerging market risk, the challenges of managing 
development and construction in a foreign environment, and the role, if any, for a developer’s 
personal vision in the value creation system.  Part II of the case allows students to re-consider 
these questions in the light of subsequent events.  At the same time, the case examines two of the 
most exciting real estate markets in the world today: Southeastern Brazil’s urban housing market, 
and the resort and vacation home market of the coastal Northeast. 
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Part One 
 
1 Introduction  
March 2003, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  Renata Oliveira shifted uncomfortably in her seat 
aboard the Boeing 747 ready to leave Brazil.  In weighing the proposed real estate deal she felt 
pulled in two directions: On the one hand, she loved the site, and believed it had great promise.  
But, on the other hand, the lack of transparency in Brazil’s real estate markets left her unsure of 
the project economics.   
How was she supposed to be sure?  Data was hard to come by in Brazil.  Unlike the 
country’s welcoming personality, its business culture was surprisingly secretive.  It treated all 
information as insider information.  She must have made twenty phone calls to hotels, pousadas 
and resorts seeking occupancy information, without learning anything. Naturally, there were no 
firms like Torto-Wheaton or Reis offering econometric forecasting, and Smith Travel Research 
had comparatively little Brazilian hotel data because few hotels were willing to report their 
results.          
She was, however, sure of one thing: over the next nine hours of flight time, she would 
figure out the economics of this investment.  By her arrival back home in Lisbon, she would 
know whether to move forward, or return to the search.  Until then, things would be up in the 
air…in more ways than one. 
1.01 Arbitrage 
There was an upside to Brazil’s transparency problem.  In fact, many of the players in the 
Brazilian real estate market embraced the unavailability of information.  To their way of thinking, 
uncertainty discouraged potential competitors, which allowed those who did participate, returns 
of 30% or more at the project level.  This, they argued, was arbitrage pure and simple.1   
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Renata was not so sure.  It was only arbitrage, she thought, for those participants who 
could obtain the “insider information”, and knew what to do with it.  For those who could not, or 
did not, the risks were unquantifiable. Without information, there was no way to know whether 
these real estate investments provided excess returns, or merely returns that were adjusted for 
unknown risks that could sneak up and bite you from behind.  Was it possible for anyone, 
particularly an outsider like herself, to obtain enough information in an emerging market like 
Brazil, to draw reasonable inferences about future cash flows?  She was determined to show that 
it was possible, and that she could do it. 
1.02 Investors 
The process of working through the deal economics was known as market and project 
financial feasibility analysis, and Renata understood its value.  Moreover, she knew that her 
group of Portuguese investors expected a rigorous and straightforward explanation of the 
investment, and a simple thumbs-up or down recommendation.   The fact that she had invested 
two years of her time to reach this point was immaterial; if the numbers didn’t work, it was back 
to square one.   
2 The Site 
As she pulled the documents from her carry-on, her attention returned to the site on the 
Northeast Coast of Brazil.  It was located at the southern end of the state of Bahia, in an area 
called Corumbau, and had taken her two years to find.  During that time she had shuttled between 
her architecture job in Lisbon, and her site search for the optimal ground on which to build a 
small exclusive resort in Brazil.  
The land contained 23 hectares (or 56.8 acres), of which 250 linear meters were beach 
frontage along the “Whale Coast” of Bahia – a marketing identity that the State had recently 
assigned its south-most coast. The site had a dense patch of old-growth Atlantic rain forest that 
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was not developable for environmental reasons, but was a key site amenity for nature tourism.  
There was a white-sand beach, and the waterfront was protected by reefs offshore, providing calm 
waters for swimming.  There was also a river that wound through the property and, where it met 
the ocean, formed natural pools of fresh/salt water.  Sunshine and warmth were typical the entire 
year in Bahia, and there had never been a tornado, hurricane, tsunami, or earthquake.2     
Surrounding uses were complementary.  An idyllic fishing village was nearby.  All 
around was the Mount Pascoal National Park, a large preserved bio-diverse jungle, which 
attracted hikers, bird-watchers, and eco-adventurers. Other interior lands belonged to the Pataxo 
Indians, who practiced native crafts, and were available for hire as forest guides or for transport 
across native lands to other nearby beach towns or to more developed areas such as the chic resort 
town of Trancoso.3     
2.01 Program 
Renata’s idea was to acquire the 23 hectares of vacant land, and develop it as high-end 
lodging for a specific market niche that was largely neglected in Brazil, and completely absent on 
the Northeast Coast.  The model was a small, very high quality inn, such as are found among the 
Relaix and Chateaux of Europe, spread out and placed on a large campus, in a tropical style.  She 
proposed to build what might be thought of as an exclusive mini-resort to be called the Corumbau 
Lodge.   
The guest accommodations would consist of nine private bungalows, each with direct 
views to the ocean.  They would achieve the highest standard of elegance to be found in Brazil.  
To complement the unspoiled setting, they would be rustic as well as refined.  Every aspect of the 
design and furnishings would harmonize the comfort of the guests with the beauty of the natural 
surroundings while acknowledging the rich local culture in a style faithful to indigenous 
influences of the area.  The bungalows, with a total area of 130 square meters each, would be the 
amplest such accommodations in Brazil.  The adobe walls would alternate with sections of thick 
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vertical wood slats or panels.  These could be rotated closed to provide privacy, or when a guest 
preferred air conditioning to natural ventilation (See Bungalow Plan Exhibit 25).   
The main lodge, a short walk from the bungalows, would house the principal common 
spaces for guests: the library, lounge and restaurant.  Transparency would inspire the design so 
that on approach, one could look right through the building to the ocean, never seeing the curtain 
of glass that wrapped the front and back of the structure.  The design inside called for high 
ceilings and an open plan.  A deck along the ocean side of the building would extend toward the 
sea (See Salon Plan Exhibit 26).  Another building would house the main reception area, the 
business office of the property, accommodations for Renata, and guest rooms for investors, when 
the bungalows were booked (See Reception Plan Exhibit 27).  While each building in the resort 
would have its own style, a set of common principals would unify them: sustainability, 
integration with the natural environment, inspiration of locale, and the developer’s own spare, 
elegant style. 
Finally, out of sight of the rest of the campus, would be employee housing, of durable 
quality, since some of the employees would be hired from outside of the immediate area (See 
Employee Housing Plan Exhibit 28).  
The built areas would occupy only a small fraction of the land (See Partial Site Plan 
Exhibit 30).  The remainder would offer the principal amenities of the site:  the river and the 
natural swimming pools it formed, the beachfront, the woods, the garden and most importantly, a 
reforestation project to which she was committed.  The site could easily fit many times the 
number of buildings and stay well within all regulatory limits, but the goal of sustainability would 
be an important part of the overall guest experience.  This was an area in which she would not 
compromise. 
The charm of the site was due in part to its remote location.  Access was not easy, but, 
she believed that travelers who wanted to enjoy nature tourism expect to travel to remote 
locations; getting there was part of the fun.  The closest international airport was in Porto Seguro.  
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It would cost a traveler R$ 1200 (about $350 in 2003, and about $600 in 2007) each way to hire a 
single engine plane to fly 15 minutes to Corumbau.  Alternatively, an off-road adventure vehicle 
could transport a guest in 3 ½ hours from Porto Seguro, through forest and across Indian lands, to 
Corumbau at half the amount.4 
She expected most guests would opt for the air transfer.  The local landing strip was 
located on a large estate belonging to the same person who owned the parcel she was negotiating 
to buy. A native of Rio, the old gentlemen was widely known as an extremely wealthy and 
reputable business man.  As a courtesy to all who lived nearby, he made the landing strip 
available to whoever wanted to use it at a small cost of R$ 350, which he donated to the 
community.5   
2.02 Acquisition 
The proposed land acquisition was uncomplicated.  The seller may have been respected 
and charitable, but he was non-negotiable on the price of R$ 940,000.  The price seemed fair 
enough – in Euros, really a pittance- but it would have made her feel better to negotiate a little.  
He was, however, willing to accept payment for the land in installments with no interest.  She 
planned to propose four installment payments at six month intervals: the first two in the amount 
of R$ 250,000 each; the second two at R$ 220,000 each. Thus the purchase price would be paid 
over twenty-four months.  They had got along very well, and he had even talked with her about 
selling his other site in Corumbau, the one with his vacation home and the landing strip.  He 
explained that he didn’t go there anymore, and his kids were not interested.  Thus, he was 
thinking of putting it on the market. 
3 Brazil Real Estate Market 
Renata had focused on a Brazilian real estate investment because: 1) international and 
macro-economic indicators provided a strong buy signal for the asset class in Brazil; 2) the real 
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estate lodging sector was about to turn a corner; 3) substantial public funds had been earmarked 
to support development of the sector in the Northeast and in Bahia in particular; and 3) the 
municipality supported her proposal.  She began to build her presentation to the investors.   
3.01 Real Estate Market International and Macroeconomic Perspective 
First, the rate of exchange in March of 2003 was extremely favorable to foreigners.  The 
Real had fallen significantly against the Dollar.  Figure 3-1 below shows that in 2001 the foreign 
exchange rate was less than R$2 per US$, but by March of 2003, the Brazilian currency had 
fallen to R$ 3.40 per US$.  
Figure 3-1: Foreign Exchange Rates, Brazil – US, 2001-20036 
 
 
At the same time, the Dollar had fallen significantly against the Euro, as shown by Figure 
3-2 below. 
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Figure 3-2: Foreign Exchange Rates, USD - Euro, 2001-20037 
 
 
The combination of the Real fall against the Dollar, and the Dollar fall against the Euro, 
meant that Brazilian assets were extremely cheap for Europeans. 
Importantly, the factors motivating the Real’s decline were rapidly evaporating, which 
suggested that the window of opportunity for foreigners to buy Brazilian assets cheap could soon 
close.  The factors motivating the Real’s decline were mainly political, as follows: 
In late 2002, the value of the Real fell in anticipation the Worker’s Party candidate Lula’s 
presidential election victory.  His impending triumph in the polls caused financial experts to 
predict disaster, eroding investor confidence and causing the Brazilian C-bond to fall by about 
60%.  Figure 3-1 above also shows the risk premium suddenly attached to the C-bond at the time 
of the election in October 2002.  In response to the adverse forecasts, foreign investment in Brazil 
contracted, and the Brazilian currency collapsed against the dollar prompting analysts to predict 
that Brazil would default on its foreign and domestic debt, much of which was indexed to the 
dollar.  According to these theories, Brazil would follow Argentina into bankruptcy.  Adding to 
the panic was the tone of pronouncements of Washington-based conservatives that Lula the 
Leftist was part of a new “axis of evil” with Castro in Cuba and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and 
had nuclear bombs and missile delivery systems that could reach Florida.8 
20 
Lula, the so-called “leftist”, appointed such radicals as Henrique Meirelles, the former 
President of Global Banking at FleetBoston Financial, as President of the Central Bank.  Lula, the 
“Marxist”, who would certainly repudiate or default on the stringent IMF budget surplus 
requirements, instead exceeded them and increased the budget surplus from 3.5% to 4.6%.  Lula, 
the inexperienced bumpkin who had never held office, demonstrated remarkable skill in building 
coalitions necessary to govern.9 
By 2003, as the financial experts’ complete misappraisal of political events became 
embarrassingly clear, and the Real began to look undervalued, investors remained cautious, and 
changed opinions only slowly.  Renata recognized that during the slow shift back to currency 
equilibrium, there was an opportunity to take advantage of the exceptional currency relationship 
that made Brazilian real estate assets cheap to Europeans. 
Second, historically, real estate values and activity in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin 
America were very closely tied to the level of foreign direct investment (FDI)10. In 2000 such 
investments were US$ 30.81 billion.  In 2002 they fell to US$ 16.57 billion in connection with 
the political events mentioned above.11  Further, much of the 2002 number involved no new 
capital infusions, but rather the conversion of debt owed to foreign companies into equity.12  The 
outlook for FDI was equally pessimistic in 200313.  Again, Renata sensed the opportunity to 
invest before real estate activity and real estate values (in Brazilian currency) rose in connection 
with a resumption of FDI to pre-election levels. 
Nowhere was this truer than in the real estate lodging sector.  FDI in that sector had been 
stalled for over a year.  In 2002, the large international hotel chains had sat on the sidelines while 
the Brazilian hotel industry experienced its lowest occupancy rates in a decade.  By 2003, 
however, the international hotel chains were beginning to prospect for sites to buy.  Portuguese 
companies such as Pestana, Vila Gale and Espirito Santo were especially active in the Northeast 
coastal region14.  Activity among British hotel companies was also noted.  Renata wanted to get 
her investors into the market before increased FDI in the sector exerted pressure on land prices. 
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Third, Renata thought that lower interest rates could soon become a reality, and began to 
consider what would happen to real estate values if interest rates fell in Brazil. She did not believe 
that the Brazilian real estate sector would follow exactly the pattern exhibited in the United States 
where lower interest rates helped fuel an explosion of real estate values.  In the United States, 
financing was a key factor: investors were able to buy at ever lower cap rates, but leverage their 
equity returns with even lower mortgage interest rates.  Brazil, where commercial real estate 
financing did not play a major role, would not follow the U.S. example perfectly.  Nevertheless, a 
decline in interest rates would lower investor expectations of return in all asset classes, including 
that of real estate, and thereby raise their values15.   
As to the likelihood of lower interest rates, there were some signs of stability already 
emerging, even though rates remained high.  It was clear that the Central Bank’s five consecutive 
increases in the Selic rate had won expectations of lower inflation as shown by the falling 
inflation ( IPCA) projections in Figure 3-3. The Central Bank decided to keep the Selic rate 
unchanged at 25% at its March meeting.  Selic rate reductions in the near future were not out of 
the question16.  Renata wanted her group to be in the market before expectations of a lower 
interest rate became widespread.     
Figure 3-3: Monetary Policy vs. Inflation, Nov 2001- Feb 200317 
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Fourth, she began to consider how Brazilian economic growth might affect real estate.  
Here there were two separate but related issues to consider: first the effect on real estate value; 
second the effect on the operations of a lodging business.  The latter would, of course, influence 
the former.  
She thought the effect of economic growth on real estate value would be positive. The 
silver lining to a falling currency is cheaper exports.  As shown by Figure 3-4 below, Brazil’s 
trade balance already demonstrated a move into positive territory for the first time in 
approximately seven years.  
Figure 3-4: Brazil’s Trade Balance, 1980-200318  
 
 
In a world where growth meant export-led growth, a positive balance of trade was very 
important.  A positive balance of trade normally resulted in greater foreign reserves, which would 
be reassuring to currency markets, thereby helping to stabilize the exchange rate, and improve the 
Country’s risk ratings, which would encourage greater FDI, and lower interest rates. All three, as 
noted previously would be positive for real estate value.   
 The effect of domestic growth on the operations of her proposed high-end resort was 
somewhat more difficult to foresee.  One could argue that a stronger currency would discourage 
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foreigners from travel to Brazil, but if the currency merely returned to its pre-election equilibrium 
level, vacations in Brazil would still look like a good deal to Europeans and Americans, as they 
did in 2001.  In a worst case scenario, she could, as the Brazilian currency strengthened, reduce 
room-night rates commensurately to provide a constant rate in Euros.  Domestic growth would 
also affect the domestic tourist market.  For example, the stronger currency could encourage more 
Brazilians to go abroad for vacation.  On the other hand, growth, depending on how shared, could 
enlarge the number of Brazilians who could afford high-end lodging such as she proposed to 
build.  In the overall, it did not appear as though currency strengthening, at least to pre-election 
levels of about R$1.9 to US$, would threaten the operating cash flow of the property. 
In sum, international and macro-economic factors including the foreign exchange rate, 
the volume of FDI, interest rates, prospects for economic growth, and recent political events, 
were strongly positive for Brazilian real estate investment, especially on the part of European 
investors.              
3.02 Lodging Real Estate Market - International and Macro-economic 
Perspective 
Supply in the Brazilian lodging market is divided among six categories: Simple, 
Economical, Tourist, Superior, Luxury and Super Luxury19.  It was evident from the Guia Quatro 
Rodas, the principal hotel guide of Brazil, that most of the lodging was of Tourist grade or 
below20.  Qualification for the two Luxury categories depended on quantifying amenities, not on 
evaluating the atmosphere and experience delivered21.  With a few notable exceptions, the luxury 
hotels in Brazil were operated by large chains that evidenced little interest in charm. 
The Brazilian lodging market, however, was not dominated by hotel chains.  In fact, of 
the 5,509 Hotels and Condo-Hotels in the country at that time, only 272 were operated by 
international chains, and 312 by national chains.  The balance of 4,925 hotels, or 89.4% of the 
supply was independently operated.  Of the 289,476 total rooms in Brazil, 202,600 of them, or 
70%, were independently owned and operated22.         
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Among the independently operated inns were a few offerings of exceptional quality and 
atmosphere such as Rosa dos Ventos in Teresopolis in Rio de Janeiro; or Solar N.S. do Rosario in 
Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais.  Inns such as these were located in the Southeast of Brazil, in vacation 
areas accessible from Sao Paulo or Rio, or in the historic colonial towns of Minas Gerais23.  No 
such offerings were located along the Northeast coast of Brazil, which was quickly becoming the 
principal resort market and leisure destination of the country.  Accordingly, the Corumbau Lodge 
was anticipated to fill a market vacancy.  
In fact, Renata had searched, without luck, for inns of comfort and quality to overnight 
during her extensive searches of the whole Brazilian Northeast coast.  She was sure others would 
be as inclined as she to stay in such places, though she had no statistical evidence to show this.  
What she had was evidence that foreign tourism was on the rise, and expected to grow rapidly.     
The table below shows an overall pattern of growth.  From 1990 to 2000, the number of 
foreign tourists multiplied by a factor of nearly five.     
 
Figure 3-5: Foreign Tourists Entering Brazil – 1970/200224 
Year Tourists Year Tourists Year Tourists Year Tourists Year Tourists 
1970 249.900 1977 634.595 1984 1.595.726 1991 1.228.178 1998 4.818.084 
1971 287.926 1978 784.316 1985 1.735.982 1992 1.692.078 1999 5.107.169 
1972 342.961 1979 1.081.799 1986 1.934.091 1993 1.641.138 2000 5.313.463 
1973 399.127 1980 1.625.422 1987 1.929.053 1994 1.853.301 2001 4.772.575 
1974 480.267 1981 1.357.879 1988 1.742.939 1995 1.991.416 2002 3,800,000
1975 517.967 1982 1.146.681 1989 1.402.897 1996 2.665.508   
1976 555.967 1983 1.420.481 1990 1.091.067 1997 2.849.750   
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The table also shows a decline in the number of foreign tourists entering Brazil from 
2000 to 2002.  It was generally understood that the pull back was temporary, and due to a 
significant drop in the number of Argentine tourists in response to their own economic woes that 
began in 200025.  As indicated below in Figure 3-6, Brazil received more than 1,700,000 tourists 
from Argentina in 2000, the largest group among foreigners that year26.  By 2002, the number had 
dropped to a little over 700,000.  
Figure 3-6: Arrivals in Brazil by Main Countries of Origin 
 
The fall in Argentine tourism had a greater impact on tourism markets in the South of 
Brazil than in those in the Northeast27.  By 2003, Argentine tourism was rising slowly.  Tourism 
from the United States retracted in response to the events of September 11, 2001, but returned to 
2000 volume by 2003. 
Renata was confident that foreign tourist demand would resume its climb in the short-
term.  In particular, the excellent exchange rate, the proximity of Europe to the Northeast coast of 
Brazil, and an historic growth trend among European visitors, suggested to her that Europeans 
would have an increasing presence in Brazilian travel.  Certainly there would be demand among 
Europeans for a tropical model that could provide the grace and comfort for which Europe was 
known. 
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It was encouraging as well that exit surveys showed that visitors to Brazil enjoyed 
themselves.  In fact many voted with their feet.  In 2002, 65% of the foreign visitors to Brazil 
were repeat visitors28. 
International tourist demand was also expected to rise over time responding to a new 
government initiative.  In 2003, the government of Brazil created the Ministry of Tourism and 
National Plan of Tourism (PNT) which was expected to animate the hotel sector.  EMBRATUR, 
the special agency connected to the Ministry, was charged with promotion of sustainable tourism 
development in municipalities with visible tourism potential, by increasing foreign tourist flows.  
In creating the Ministry, the government recognized the importance of the sector to the Brazilian 
economy29.   
Foreign visitors to Brazil, while an important component of hotel demand, were a 
relatively small fraction of all hotel guests.  In 2003, 24% of hotel guests were foreigners, and 
76% were Brazilians.  In resorts, the results were further skewed with Brazilians composing more 
than 82% of the demand30.  She suspected that these figures varied significantly with room rate, 
but did not have statistics to support this.   
However, she did have a breakdown of foreign and Brazilian guests in city hotels by rate.  
In hotels charging R$ 90 daily or less, Brazilians were 90.1% of the market.  In those charging 
between R$190 and R$ 90, Brazilians represented 73.9% of the market.  In hotels with rates over 
R$ 190, Brazilians comprised only 44% of the market31.   
Renata wondered how she could better predict the percentage of international and 
domestic demand for her resort.  She knew from the above data that higher price tended to 
concentrate the foreign component of demand.  She also knew that her mini-resort would appeal 
mainly to leisure guests (market segmentation is further discussed in section 4.05 herein), and that 
in 2002, 55.21% of foreign tourists came for leisure, 28.28% came for business, and the 
remainder for a variety of reasons32. She felt that there should be some way of getting a handle on 
the profile of her customers.         
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3.03 Lodging Real Estate Market – Regional, State and Municipal 
Perspective 
The coastline of Brazil is divided into four regions: 1) The North or Amazonian Coast is 
comprised of the coastlines of two states: Amapa (AP) and Para (PA);  2)The Northeast Coast, 
which encompasses the coastlines of nine states: Maranhao (MA), Piaui (PI), Ceara (CE), Rio 
Grande do Norte (RN), Paraiba (PB), Pernambuco (PE), Alagoas (AL), Sergipe (SE), and the 
relatively long coast of Bahia (BA); 3) The Southeastern Coast includes the coastlines of three 
states: Espirito Santo (ES), Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and Sao Paulo (SP);  4)  The Southern coast is the 
coastlines of three states: Parana (PR), 
Santa Catarina (SC), and Rio Grande do 
Sul (RS).  The map to the side shows all 
regions of the country in different tones33.  
Only the coastal states are listed above.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7: Map of Brazil 
The Northeast coast has particularly beautiful and varied beaches (See Figure 3-10).  The 
air and water temperature are warm all year, especially so during the European and American 
winter.  In the more northerly of the states in this region, rainfall tends to concentrate during the 
European and American spring.  Moving south in the region, the rainfall differences between 
seasons are less pronounced.   
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Figure 3-8: Map of Northeast Coast. 
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Within the region landscapes are very different.  The contrast, for example between the 
desert-like landscapes of giant dunes in Ceara and Rio Grande do Norte, and the lush tropical 
landscapes of Bahia, are striking34.  Aside from the major cities of the Northeast coast, there were 
some areas already in development for tourism, especially in Bahia and Pernambuco.  Much of 
the coast was undeveloped, attractive, and inexpensive.  Prices tended to be greater with faster 
and easier access to major airports35.  Average income was lower in the Northeastern states than 
in those of the Southeast36. 
In the early 1990’s, the Northeast coast of Brazil had begun to establish itself as a tourist 
destination37.  Its size alone presented an opportunity far greater than most tourist destinations 
around the world.  The target domestic markets for the Northeast were the middle and upper 
classes, which were mainly located in the Southeast region, predominantly in Sao Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro38.  The Southeast already had several well established tourist destinations such as 
Buzios and Angra dos Reis.  Accordingly, in 2003, the major impediments to developing the 
Northeast for tourism, both domestic and foreign, were accessibility and infra-structure39.  A 
close third was the need for trained hotel personnel.  The state of Bahia took the lead in facing 
these obstacles40.     
  
Figure 3-9: Location of Bahia in Brazil 
B
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Bahia had many advantages for a prime tourist market, including a perfect climate, 
sections of rainforest along its 1000 kilometers of coast, beautiful beaches, rivers, waterfalls, 
mountains, an improving transportation infrastructure and a variety of accessible leisure options.  
Furthermore, it had a rich colonial history dating back to the discovery of Brazil by a caravan of 
Portuguese mariners in 1500 off the coast of Bahia.  In fact, it was Mount Pascoal, located in 
Corumbau, which captured the discoverers’ attention, and resulted in their claiming the land for 
the throne of Portugal.  The Portuguese colonists made Salvador the capital of the colony41.  
Evidence of the early colonization of this area is found in its enduring, rich architectural heritage 
dating to the early 1500’s.      
Bahia also had stronger African roots than did any other location in the Americas42.  
African cultures and religions were preserved over hundreds of years by incorporating, and being 
incorporated by, European and Native American influences.  The exotic Afro-Brazilian mixture 
of races, religions, language, music, folklore, dance, clothing, art and sculpture is the hallmark of 
Bahian culture.  Most distinctive of all is the cuisine: savory mixtures of multi-cultural 
ingredients and techniques made Bahian food alone motivation to visit43. 
Recognizing the potential of its natural resources and native culture, the government of 
Bahia implemented a program of planned development beginning with an investment to improve 
living conditions for its own people.  Starting in 1991, Federal development funds for the 
Northeast, known as Produteur I and II, were used first to improve basic sanitation, public health, 
electric energy, environmental projects, and then for airports, historic renovation, highways, and 
education.  Funds were also used to create schools of tourism and hotel training, establish tourism 
research institutes, create an Institute of Hospitality, establish the Forum on Advanced Studies in 
Tourism (FEAT), reform the famed Pelourinho district of Salvador – one of its big cultural 
attractions, build convention centers in Porto Seguro and Ilheus, expand the facility in Salvador, 
establish a cultural program and calendar, conduct marketing campaigns inside Brazil and at fairs 
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and workshops in foreign countries, and renovate and enlarge theaters and other cultural 
infrastructure.  By 2000, Bahia had invested $1.5 billion in such projects44.     
 As a result, the government of Bahia attracted hotel groups such as Accor, Marriott, Sol 
Meliá, ClubMed, Pestana, SuperClubs, Kempinsky, Vila Galé, Iberostar, Reta Atlântico, Orissio, 
among others, to do business within the state.  Between 1991 and 2001 it grew tourism in the 
State from 1.9 million annually to 4.3 million, an increase of 117.5%45.   
The government intended to invest an additional $805 million in Produteur funds 
between 2001 and 2005.  Then, between 2005 and 2012, it planned to invest another $4.5 billion 
towards a goal of becoming the best tropical destination in the world.  In 2002, it won the award 
for best tourist destination in South America at the World Travel Awards46.  
As part of its plan, Bahia established tourist zones along the coast of the state, each with a 
distinctive personality and its own set of ecological, sports and cultural attractions.   By 2003, 
some of the Tourist areas such as Porto Seguro on the Discovery Coast, or Praia do Forte on the 
Coconut Coast, were well established tourist markets.  Now in its second phase of Produteur,  the 
Bahian government hoped to stimulate a surge in tourism by promoting less well-known 
locations, including, most significantly for Renata, the Whale Coast municipality of Prado in 
which Corumbau was located47.   
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Figure 3-10: Map of Bahia Tourist Areas 
3.04 Market Conclusions - 2003 
All this sounded pretty good to Renata Oliveira.  At the national level, Brazilian real 
estate looked promising, especially to foreigners who could make a double play: first by real 
estate appreciation in Brazilian currency; second by Brazilian currency appreciation in Euros. 
At the regional level, the Northeast of the Country provided an opportunity to enter a 
lodging and tourism real estate market with huge potential because of the Region’s size and 
natural attributes, at the early stages of its growth.  She speculated that with enough infrastructure 
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development and private investment, the Northeast could become for Europe, what the beaches of 
Mexico had become for the United States.   
At the State level, Bahia would make a priority of developing her proposed Whale Coast 
location.  It was committed to protecting the environment, raising hotel quality, promoting 
economic sustainability, providing for the local population, building a tourism culture, and 
training a hotel service workforce.  She could not have written a more suitable policy herself.  At 
the municipal level, she was also impressed.  The municipal leaders had taken the time to become 
acquainted with her and her proposal.  The Mayor and the Secretary of Tourism in the 
government of Prado were young, smart and ambitious.  They would be fully supportive of her 
investment.  The Secretary of Tourism also owned a travel agency, and was eager to book her 
customers! 
Now all she had to do was the numbers. 
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4  Feasibility 
The objective of the Financial Analysis would be to calculate the rate of return to her 
investors and ascertain whether it fairly compensates them for the risk.  Initially that meant 
finding the ex ante internal rate of return for the investment using Discounted Cash Flow 
Analysis. Following that she would use Sensitivity Analysis to project the volatility in the ex ante 
return.  The DCF analysis would have several simplifying assumptions: 
First, it would assume an instantaneous cash outlay for land acquisition and construction 
at Time Zero, i.e., at the start of Year 1.  She knew that this was an unrealistic assumption, but 
until she had more information about the timing of installment purchase payments and 
construction outlays, she wanted to keep it simple.   
Second, it would assume a ten-year investment period with a sale at the end of Year 10.  
The sales price would be calculated by applying a 12% capitalization rate to the projected Year 
11 NOI.  Naturally she hoped that cap rates would come down in Brazil, but she wanted to be 
conservative for this projection. 
Third, it would assume the buyer to be a Brazilian corporation.  The cash flow projection 
would therefore have to recognize all taxes payable by the corporation incurred in operating, or 
upon the sale of, the property.  From the perspective of the property owner, though not 
necessarily that of the investors, this was to be an After-Tax Discounted Cash Flow Analysis. 
4.01 Room Revenue, Occupancy Rate, Room-Nights, RevPAR, and ADR 
Hotel revenues, she had learned, were composed of Room Revenue and Non-room 
Revenue.  Since the latter was a function of the former, she would work first on Room Revenue.  
The hotel industry used a term called RevPAR or Revenue per available room which was simply 
the hotel’s average daily revenue divided by the total number of rooms in the hotel48. 
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RevPAR could also be defined as the hotel’s Occupancy Rate multiplied by its ADR or 
Average Daily Rate.  The Average Daily Rate was the average rate actually charged for an 
occupied room.  It could be determined in several ways, one of which was to divide daily room 
revenue by the number of rooms occupied that day, and take the average for the period in 
question.  Occupancy Rate was the rate of occupancy expressed as a percentage.  Technically it 
was the number of Room-Nights the hotel was occupied by paying guests, divided by the product 
of total number of rooms multiplied by the number of nights in the period49. 
She wrote down the following relationships to keep everything straight: 
 
Total Number of Rooms 
x 
Number of Nights in Period 
= 
Number of Room-Nights 
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Total Number of Occupied Room-Nights in Period 
÷ 
Total Number of Room-Nights in Period 
= 
Occupancy Rate 
x 
ADR 
= 
RevPAR 
x 
Number of Rooms 
= 
Daily Room Revenue 
x 
Days in Period 
= 
Room Revenue for Period 
 
 
Clearly, the key to estimating Room Revenue for a proposed hotel was to correctly 
forecast its Occupancy rate and ADR.  To find out how this was done in Brazil, she obtained 
several market and feasibility analyses prepared by some of the top hotel consultants in the 
Country.   
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4.02 Competitive Set Profile 
The studies that she looked at began by identifying a set of hotels believed to be 
competitive with the proposed hotel.  The Occupancy rate and ADR of each competitor was 
shown, and that information was used to calculate each hotel’s Production Index and Market 
Penetration as shown in the following example of a 2-hotel competitive set: 
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A 433 158,045 .70 .84 132,757 .71 1.014 250 33,189,250 .65 210 .9286 
B 190 69,350 .30 .80 55,480 .29 .9667 330 18,308,400 .35 264 1.167 
TOTL 623 227,395 1.0 .83 188,237 1.0   51,497,650    
 
 
• Fair Market Share = Room Nights for Hotel/Total Rm-Nights for Hotels in Set 
• Actual Market Share = Occupied Room Nights for Hotel/Total Occupied Rm-Nights for 
Hotels in set.   
• Market Penetration = Actual Market Share/Fair Market Share 
• Production Index = Hotel % of Total Revenues/Fair Market Share 
If all hotels were equally competitive, then each hotel’s Fair Market Share would on 
average equal its Actual Market Share.  In reality, some hotels captured more or less of the 
market than implied by the simple relationship between their room stock and the total market 
room stock.  The degree to which a hotel captured more or less than its Fair Market Share was 
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expressed in the Market Penetration.  For example, if a hotel had a Market Penetration of 1.24, 
then it captured 24% more of the market than implied by the percentage its stock of rooms 
represented in the market as a whole50. 
Market Penetration was one measure of a hotel’s competitive position.  It was 
incomplete, however, because it considered Occupancy alone, without considering the room rate.  
Understandably, a hotel with high Occupancy may have low room rates, and visa versa.  A 
second measure of a hotel’s competitive position, Production Index, takes both Occupancy and 
ADR into account.  It compares the percentage of the total room revenues for the entire market 
that a particular hotel captures, with the percentage it should capture based on its share of the total 
rooms in the market51. 
These two measures, Market Penetration and the Production Index, gave the experts an 
important feel for the competitive position of each hotel in the set.  Renata was eager to make 
these calculations for a set of hotels competitive to the mini resort that she proposed.  But first, 
she would need data. 
4.03 Data 
Clearly data was a critical element in the process.  Without Occupancy Rate and ADR 
information for the competitive set of hotels, there was no way to begin the feasibility analysis.  
That, thought Renata, is where her persistence paid big dividends.  Renata Oliveira did not stop at 
the twenty phone calls to resorts, hotels and pousadas.  She plugged away until she struck gold in 
the middle of a lecture on Planning and Developing of Hotels, part of the curriculum for the Real 
Estate MBA program at the University of Sao Paulo College of Architecture and Urbanism.   
The speaker was a guest lecturer named Carlos Abreu, an expert in Brazil’s hotel 
industry.  In response to a question, it became apparent that Carlos had assembled a great deal of 
data in his years of practice.  One lunch later, and Renata held in her hand spreadsheets showing 
daily Occupancy Rates for nineteen resorts and seven pousadas during the period beginning 
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October 2001 through September 2002.  The hotels and pousadas selected were not a perfect 
match for the specialty resort she envisioned in Corumbau. But, with a little trimming, it would 
be hard to find a significantly better competitive set. 
As Carlos had explained to her, the competitors in a competitive set need not be located 
in the same local geographic area.  Hotels are competitors if they compete for the same demand 
pool.  Competitors may be identified by looking at the hotel image, class, i.e., number of stars, 
and facilities, and comparing these to the subject hotel52.  
The Spreadsheets with daily occupancy data are attached as Exhibits 1 -24.  Renata added 
a new worksheet that summarized a full year of activity of the 19 resorts, showing their monthly 
and annual averages. 
Renata took a critical look at the hotels in the competitive set.  Based on information 
from each hotel’s website, and information in her Brazil travel information guide, Guia Quatro 
Rodas 2002, she eliminated Carlton, Sofitel Quatro Rodas, Othon Place, Transamerica Salvador, 
Caesar Towers, Bahia Fiesta and Salvador Praia, which were urban vertical hotels, and didn’t 
belong in the competitive set.  Then, using the format shown for Market Penetration and 
Production Index (See Section 4.05 for current ADR), she made the preliminary calculations for 
the eleven remaining resorts, and copied them to Power Point slides for her investor presentation 
the next day.  To be truthful, however, she was not sure how these calculations would help her 
forecast the Occupancy Rate for the proposed resort. 
4.04 Average Occupancy Rate for the Competitive Set 
The next step, according to the professional feasibility studies, was to calculate the 
Average Occupancy Rate for the competitive set, and to project that rate going forward.  The 
studies that she examined reflected anticipated demand growth.  Supply was increased too, but 
only by the stock of Room-Nights supplied by the hotel under study beginning in the year it was 
expected to open. 
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In the example below, there is a stock of 159,505 Room-Nights, and therefore 437 rooms 
in the competitive set which is unrelated to the competitive set identified above.  The total 
occupied Room-Nights for the competitive set is 95,707.  Thus the Occupancy Rate for the set is, 
on average, 60%.  In the example, demand for rooms is expected to grow by 5% annually, 
thereby increasing the occupied Room-Nights in each year.  In 2009, the 120 room hotel under 
study is expected to open, adding 43,800 Room-Nights to the total stock reducing average 
Occupancy Rate to 52%. 
 
  Figure 4-1: Average Occupancy Rate53 
RATE OF GROWTH 5%         
          
YEAR 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 2.011 2.012 2.013 2.014 2.015 
Previous supply 159.505 159.505 159.505 203.305 203.305 203.305 203.305 203.305 203.305
Additions   43.800       
Current Supply 159.505 159.505 203.305 203.305 203.305 203.305 203.305 203.305 203.305
Projected Demand 95.707 100.492 105.516 110.792 116.332 122.149 128.256 134.669 141.402
Average Occupancy Rate 60% 63% 52% 54% 57% 60% 63% 66% 70%
 
The problem with this approach, as Renata Oliveira saw it, was that it grew demand, but 
ignored growth in supply from sources other than the subject hotel.  The rationale for ignoring 
supply growth was that the new supply volume was difficult to predict.  While that was, no doubt, 
true, it did not seem to follow that the volume of new supply should be set at zero. 
Even more troubling was the subsequent step forecasting Occupancy Rate.  It relied 
completely on the experience and intuition of the analyst.  The estimate took into account the 
average Occupancy Rate for the competitive set as calculated in the example above.  It also 
considered the Market Penetration and Productive Index of the various hotels in the competitive 
set.  These parameters for the competing hotels, and the analyst’s impression of the relative 
appeal of the new hotel, together with numerous other factors, were used to estimate the 
Occupancy Rate for the proposed hotel.  But, as far as Renata could tell, there was no method 
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exactly to the forecast.  The approach, she thought, may work for analysts with considerable years 
of experience in the market under study, but it was not a technique that she as a newcomer and an 
outsider could apply.  So, for the time being, she set this approach to the side and contemplated a 
different approach. 
4.05 Occupancy Rate Forecast for Proposed Hotel 
While she understood that there was no scientific way to forecast the Occupancy Rate, 
she sought a technique that would break the estimating process into smaller steps, perhaps letting 
her develop expectations for the proposed hotel’s Occupancy, by measuring its projected drawing 
power in specific dimensions and comparing its dimension-specific drawing power with that of 
its competitors.   
In fact, Renata had discovered an approach for doing just that.  By fusing the methods 
used in the professional feasibility analyses of lodging real estate in Brazil, with concepts 
borrowed from a well-known hotel text from the United States, one that had been recommended 
by a hotel consultant in Sao Paulo, Renata had built a model for this part of the feasibility 
analysis.  She pulled out her notes and began to work through each step of the calculation.     
Step 1: Calculate the Competitive Index for each Hotel in the Competitive Set 
This method for forecasting occupancy in a proposed hotel assigned each property in the 
Competitive Set a Competitive Index.  She made the following note:  
 
Hotel’s Average Occupancy Rate 
x 
365 
= 
Hotel’s Competitive Index54 
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On a spreadsheet she calculated the Competitive Index for each resort.   
Step Two: Apportion Each Property’s Competitive Index by Market Segment 
Market segmentation in Brazil considered five sources of demand: Business, Events, 
Individual Tourism (leisure), Group Tourism (leisure) and Airlines55.  The market segments were 
characterized as follows: 
Business - This market selects hotels on the basis of proximity to local work.  Customers 
tend to be loyal rather than experimental, if they are satisfied.  But they are motivated by price.  It 
is common practice to offer corporate discounts of approximately 20% of the counter rate.  The 
clientele demands guaranteed reservations because they normally check in late.  They spend in 
the hotel an average 30% to 35% of the daily rate in other services.  Highest demand is during 
weekdays56.   
Events  - This market is similar to the business market.  The main differences are that the 
flow is irregular, and the market is more sensitive to price.  Discounts tend to run around 30%.  
Customers spend in the range of up to 50% of the room rate on extra services.  Events take place 
inside the hotel and the hotel must generally be built or adapted to the dimensional needs of 
common and service areas to accommodate the events.  The strongest demand is again during 
weekdays57.     
Airlines - This is the market for providing lay-over accommodations for airline 
companies.  It generally   depends on advance arrangements with the airline companies, which 
depends on distance from the airports. Discounts are between 25% and 30%58.       
Individual Tourism - The market tends to be less price-sensitive than either the business 
or events markets.  It favors weekends, but occupancy has less of a distinct pattern than does the 
business market.  Clients spend about 30% of room rate on extras.  Customers make reservations 
themselves, or through a travel agency, which will reduce the effective rate59.         
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Group Tourism - This segment is extremely sensitive to price and spends little on 
extras.  Discounts run about 50%.  Groups are drawn to locations with significant tourist 
attractions.  Demand is concentrated over holiday periods and on weekends.  This segment can 
conflict with the business segment60. 
For simplicity she reduced the number of segments to three by moving Airlines into 
Business, and combining Individual and Group Tourism as Leisure.  The Room-Night demand in 
each hotel of the competitive set had to be allocated among the different market segments.  This 
could be done by carefully examining the occupancy patterns at each hotel on a daily basis for the 
entire year, by asking people familiar with the occupancy of the hotels in question, by studying 
the physical amenities of each hotel (for example if they did not have a seminar room, then they 
probably did not generate a lot of Event occupancy) and by a combination of the above 
techniques. 
She had already spoken with a hotel consultant about the segmentation of demand at each 
hotel, and had looked-up the physical amenities for each hotel, which were listed in the Guia 
Quattro Rodas, and often on the hotel’s website.  She took a moment to review the daily 
Occupancy Rate at each hotel as given by Exhibits 1 – 12.  In particular she looked for seasonal 
fluctuation and weekly fluctuation in the numbers.  For example, a hotel that emptied out on 
weekends, but was full during the week, probably derived a substantial portion of its occupancy 
from business.  Such an occupancy profile was typical, for example, of hotels in Sao Paulo.  The 
months of June and August were typically the weakest months in the Northeast for leisure 
demand.  A leisure hotel that could maintain an Occupancy Rate of 40% - 50% of its 
December/January demand during these months, could probably generate guests from Business or 
Event segments.  By contrast, December, January and February were the months of greatest 
demand from the leisure segments, with a particular spike for a ten-day period following 
Christmas61.  
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Once she had approximated the percentage of a hotel’s demand by segment, it was easy to 
allocate its Competitive Index to each segment, by multiplying the Competitive Index by the 
percentage approximated.  On the spreadsheet she had begun, she apportioned the Competitive 
Index for each resort as follows: 
 
PERCENTAGE OF HOTEL OCCUPCY COMPETITIVE INDEX
DERIVED FROM SEGMENT DERIVED FROM SEGMENT
HOTELS COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL EVENTS LIESURE COMMERCIAL EVENTS LIESURE
INDEX
PRAIA DO FORTE ECORESORT 208 10 10 80 21 21 166
TRANSAMÉRICA COMANDATUBA 177 15 25 60 27 44 106
CABO DE SANTO AGOSTINHO 235 25 25 50 59 59 118
CATUSSABA 251 50 0 50 126 0 126
SUPERCLUB'S          BREEZES 209 10 25 65 21 52 136
SOFITEL COSTA SAUÍPE 103 10 10 80 10 10 82
SOFITEL SAUÍPE SUITES 108 10 10 80 11 11 86
SUMMERVILLE    MURO ALTO 277 25 25 50 69 69 138
  BLUE TREE ANGRA 180 15 25 60 27 45 108
RENAISSANCE SAUÍPE 134 10 10 80 13 13 107
MARRIOT SAUÍPE 144 10 10 80 14 14 115  
 
Figure 4-2: Competitive Index Table 
Step 3: Apportion Each Hotel’s Room Night’s Captured by Segment 
This was just a matter of multiplying the percentage of a property’s occupancy derived 
from a particular segment by the property’s total occupied Room Nights62.  
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Property Commercial Events Leisure Total 
A     
B     
C     
D     
Total     
 
Step 4: Decide how to distribute future demand by market segment. 
She considered whether there was a reason to think future demand would be distributed 
differently among market segments than are current Room-Nights.  Personally, she believed that 
leisure demand growth would outpace the other segments, but had no statistical support for the 
belief.  She would apply the current Room-Night distribution to future demand.  So, for the 
market as a whole, she calculated each segment’s percentage of the total Occupied Room- Nights.     
Step 5: Forecast the additional Room-Night demand between the present and opening the 
proposed property 
 
The Starting Demand was easily calculated.  Selecting a rate of demand growth required 
some thought.  From 1990 to 2000 the Cumulative Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of foreign 
tourism in the country was 16.68%63.  Embratur predicted that the number of foreign tourists to 
Brazil would grow to 9 million by 201064.  Based on that prediction, she calculated the CAGR 
between 2002 and 2010, which gave her a different number.  These forecasts, however, did not 
include domestic tourists, who were most of the market.  The analyst at the Bahiaturista offices 
had a more modest forecast for Bahia of about 8% per year through approximately 2010.  That 
figure, however, was for all tourism to the State. She wondered if the hotels in the competitive 
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set, which were luxury hotels and therefore, she thought, more likely to attract foreigners, may do 
better than the State as a whole.  After considerable thought she chose a CAGR for demand, but 
also noted a range within which demand was likely to grow. She applied the growth rate to 
calculate the additional Occupied Room-Nights each year through 2016.  She expected the 
proposed hotel to be in operation not later than June 2006.  From the chart she could easily 
calculate the additional demand in the market that was expected to arise by the opening. 
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
           
Start 
Demand  
          
Additional 
Demand 
          
End 
Demand 
          
 
 
Step 6: Distribute the Additional Demand by Segment 
Here she went back to the spreadsheet prepared in step 3, and added rows for the 
Additional Demand and the new total demand as of 2006.  The Total Cell for Additional Demand 
was just the added demand between 2002 and 2006 calculated in Step 5. To distribute the 
Additional Demand by segment was just a matter of multiplying the percentages for each segment 
calculated in step 4 by the Total Added Demand.  
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Property Commercial Events Leisure Total 
A     
B     
C     
D     
Total     
Added Demand     
Total (2006)     
 
 
Step 7: Assign a Competitive Index to each Segment of the Proposed Hotel65 
Renata made an objective assessment of the proposed mini-resort’s drawing power in 
each market segment by comparison with the drawing power of the other hotels. Would it be 
more like Hotel A with regard to Commercial and Hotel B with regard to Events?   
She took the following into consideration:  First, with only nine bungalows, she would 
not be hosting events.  Second, based on her distance from any companies, it was very unlikely 
that the hotel would experience commercial demand.   
That left only the Leisure Segment.  The highest Competitive Index in this segment 
belonged to Praia do Forte Eco-resort (PDER).  PDER was located one hour by car on paved 
highways from the Salvador International Airport.  The town of Praia do Forte was a popular 
resort destination.  PDER was the leader in Eco-tourism in the Country, and enjoyed an excellent 
reputation in Europe as well as in Brazil for its service and find cuisine66.  Renata could compete 
on the basis of food, service, accommodations and ambience, but she knew that accessibility and 
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destination counted for a lot.  Corumbau was not a known destination in or outside Brazil, and it 
was hard to get to67.    
Summerville in Muro Alto was next on the list with a Competitive Index of 138.  Muro 
Alto was part of the Porto de Galinhas resort area, a major tourist destination for both Europeans 
and South Americans68.  It too was accessible by car from the Recife International Airport in 
Pernambuco69.   
Next was Transamerica Commandatuba with its 362 rooms, multiple amenities including 
a spa and a golf course, and huge annual marketing budget.  It too was more accessible than was 
Corumbau. 
After carefully reviewing the entire list, she made a conservative assignment of 
competitive index for each segment of the Corumbau Lodge.   
Step 8: Forecast the additional Supply of Room-Nights expected to enter the market by 
June 2006 (including the proposed property) and thereafter until 2016 
 
Based on conversations with the Secretary of Tourism’s office in Bahia, and with three 
private hotel consultants who knew the supply pipeline intimately, including which proposals had 
financing, Renata anticipated a supply CAGR in the Competitive Set of around 10%.  Using this 
forecast, she calculated the additions to stock and end stock each year through 2016.  There were 
no Removals anticipated because the hotels in the Competitive Set were relatively new. 
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Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
           
Start 
Stock 
          
Additions 
 
          
Removals 
 
          
End 
Stock 
          
      
 
Step 9: Assign a Competitive Index to each Segment of the other Hotels expected to enter 
the Market 
 
Renata next made the conservative assumption that new hotels coming on line would try 
to match or exceed the hotel with the highest Competitive Index, the greatest Market Penetration 
in the Competitive Set.  Thus she assigned to all other new supply that may enter the market over 
the period in question, the most competitive hotel’s Competitive Index and its allocation across 
Market Segments. 
Step 10: Calculate Each Property’s Market Share Adjuster in each Market Segment for all 
Properties on line in 200670. 
 
She set up a separate spreadsheet for each market segment.  Note that the number of 
rooms in the Other Entries should be the total added supply calculated in step 8, less the added 
stock from the proposed hotel divided by 365. 
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COMMERCIAL 
SEGMENT 
Number of 
Rooms 
Commercial 
Competitive 
Index 
Commercial 
Market Adjuster 
 
Hotel A     
Hotel B     
Hotel C     
Proposed Hotel     
Other Entries     
   Total:  
 
For each property she calculated the adjuster. 
 
 
Hotel’s Commercial Competitive Index 
X 
Number of Rooms in Hotel 
= 
Commercial Segment Adjuster for the Hotel71 
 
 
Then she repeated the process for each segment. 
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Step 11: Find the Market Share for each property by segment. 
She copied the three spreadsheets in Step 10.  She labeled the empty right-most column 
‘Market Share’, and completed the work sheets as follows: 
 
 
Commercial Segment Adjuster for the Hotel 
÷ 
The Sum of the Commercial Segment Adjuster for all Hotels 
= 
Hotel’s Commercial Market Share72   
 
 
Step 12:  Find the Room-Nights captured by each property in each segment (now including 
the additional Room-Night demand and additional stock) 
 
Renata prepared a new spreadsheet of Room-Nights Captured.  The Room-Nights 
captured in each cell will be the product of the total demand in each segment calculated in step 6 
multiplied by the hotel’s segment market share calculated in step 11.  Total Room-Nights 
captured by each property is the sum of its three segments.     
Property Commercial Event Leisure Total 
Property A     
Property B     
Property C     
Proposed     
Other Entries     
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Step 13: Find the Occupancy Rate of each property.   
She added an Occupancy Rate column to the spreadsheet above and entered the 
forecasted occupancy rate for each property.   
Property Commercial Event Leisure Total Occupancy 
Rate 
Property A      
Property B      
Property C      
Proposed      
Other 
Entries 
     
 
Step 14: Project the Average Occupancy Rate for the Competitive Set for 10 years 
Returning to the spreadsheets in steps 5 and 8, she determined the Average Occupancy 
Rate in each year.  
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Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
           
Start 
Demand  
          
Additional 
Demand 
          
End 
Demand 
          
Average 
Occupancy 
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Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
           
Start 
Stock 
          
Additions 
 
          
Removals 
 
          
End 
Stock 
          
 
Step 15: Consider the projected Occupancy Rate for the proposed property. 
She considered her forecasted Occupancy Rate for the proposed property, and wondered 
if it made sense given the average occupancy for the competitive set, and the features and 
characteristics of the proposed property.  She noted that the forecasted Occupancy Rate is the 
stabilized rate.  During the early years, she would reduce the rate to reflect the gradual increase to 
stabilized occupancy.  At this point, she wanted to ensure that her forecast made sense given what 
she knew about the properties in the Competitive Set, and the property she planned to develop.   
Step 16: Repeat the Process for the Pousadas. 
This was easier because there was no market segmentation.  The Pousadas drew only 
from the Leisure segment.  She considered how these results affected her Occupancy projection. 
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Step 17: Determine the Occupancy Rate during the Phase-in period 
Renata noticed that in the Feasibility studies, proposed projects did not attain their 
stabilized Occupancy Rate in the first year of operation.  It required time for the new hotel’s 
image to become fixed in the consumer market.  So the Occupancy Rate evolved, in these studies, 
over three to six years.  She noted different build-up schedules from the reports. 
 
Six Year Build-up Schedule73 
Year % of Stabilized Occupancy Rate 
1 58 
2 67 
3 75 
4 83 
5 92 
6 100 
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Five-Year Build-up Schedule74 
Year % of Stabilized Occupancy Rate 
1 73 
2 80 
3 86 
4 93 
5 100 
 
Renata knew that with only nine units she would have a very small marketing budget.  
She also knew that the remote location offered little opportunity for visibility.  On the other hand, 
by designing a product that was unique, eye-catching, responsive to the environment she felt that 
the resort would be written up in the better travel and life-style magazines in both Europe and 
Brazil.  She weighed that information and wrote her own build-up schedule.  
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4.06 ADR Forecast for Proposed Hotel 
 
 
ADR January – October 200275 
 
H
ot
el
s 
  
R
oo
m
s 
 
A
D
R
 
 
Praia do Forte 249 384,42 
Transamérica 359 439,29 
Superclubs 324 425,27 
Marriott 256 262,52 
Renaissance 237 261,82 
Sofitel Conv 404 241,12 
Sofitel Suítes 198 300,44 
Catussaba 256 177,97 
Cabo Sto Ago 298 328,10 
Salinas 203 161,52 
Summerville 202 297,84 
Blue Tree Angra 319 419,43 
Total 3305 329,35 
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Renata carefully reviewed the ADR for resorts in the competitive set.  She noted 
significant differences between the Corombau accommodations that she planned to build, and 
those in the competitive set.  
First, all nine of the Corombau accommodations would be individual chalets or 
bungalows, which were infinitely more desirable than the apartment-style accommodations in all 
the other resorts.  Secondly, all nine of the Corombau accommodations were identical, so there 
would be no averaging down of the rate.  In the other resorts had a range of prices, and the lesser 
quality rooms lowered the average rate.    
For example, at the Praia do Forte Ecoresort, shown above at an ADR of R$384, a 
superior room (far smaller and less desirable than the product she would build) double occupancy 
was R$ 691 per night, and single occupancy was $R 552 per night.  Similarly, at the Mariott, 
shown above with an ADR of 262.52, a standard double occupancy with ocean view was R$ 599 
per night76.   
All the Corombau accommodations would have ocean views.  All would achieve a 
substantially higher quality in design, materials, spaciousness, privacy, than even the best 
accommodations elsewhere.  There would be no averaging down because all accommodations 
were identical.  The Corumbau guest profile suggested mainly double occupancy.  The Corumbau 
Lodge would provide three meals each day as part of the ADR, whereas most of the others in the 
Competitive Set provided just breakfast and dinner77. 
All her instincts told her to start with a base rate higher than R$ 691, Praia do Forte 
Ecoresort’s superior double occupancy rate.  Nevertheless, in the interest of making a 
conservative forecast she began with the rate of $R691.  To forecast the ADR as of a 2006 
opening, she would need to increase this number for inflation by three years. She reviewed the 
inflation index for the recent past, and estimated future inflation at 8 – 10% per annum.  She 
trended the base rate forward by 9% per annum, and rounded up to $R900.    
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Figure 4-3: Brazil Inflation Table78 
Year 1969 1970 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Inflation rate 
(Index: 1990 = 100)  15.48 18.9 100 166 238 275.77 
 
Then she remembered the surge in demand for about two months beginning late 
December through late February.  During that period, she felt that the accommodations could 
command their true worth.  She estimated $R1200 per night for the high season.  
Finally, she wanted to think about the relationship between ADR and Occupancy Rate.  
She looked at the graph in Exhibit 29 which showed this relationship for the properties in the 
Competitive Set, and wondered to what extent her choice of room rate would affect her 
Occupancy Rate.     
4.07 Room Revenue Forecast 
The forecast for Occupancy Rate and ADR, provided all the information necessary to 
forecast annual Room Revenue.  
4.08 Non-Room Revenue 
She pulled more documents out of her carry-on, and was glad she had upgraded her seat 
to business class.  The documents were starting to pile up.  Hotel Investment Advisors distributed 
an annual Lodging Industry in Numbers report for Brazil that included a detailed analysis of 
resort income and expense.  She reviewed the most recent reports, and found that, in accordance 
with the Uniform Systems of Accounts for Hotels published by the American Hotel and Motel 
Association, the major categories of Non-Room Revenue were Food, Beverage, Telephone and 
Other Income.  Immediately she eliminated Food from the list, as she planned to include three 
meals each day with the Room Rate.  Focusing on the remaining three items, she observed that 
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the average income from each of these items, as a percentage of Total Revenues, did not vary 
significantly from year to year.  She noted the percentage for each item from the 2003 Resort 
Analysis. 
 
Figure 4-4: Department Revenue as a Percent of Total Revenue  
Brazil Resorts 200379 
Beverage 8.2% 
Telephone .8% 
Other (Laundry) 1.8% 
            
Having already forecasted Room Revenues, she was able to use the above percentages to 
forecast Non-Room Revenue and Total Revenue.   
Renata now had the information that she needed to build the income section of the  
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis.  
4.09 Expenses     
She returned to the HIA Lodging Industry in Numbers reports.  Expenses were divided 
into two major sections: Departmental Expenses and Undistributed Operational Expenses.  The 
former was composed of Room Expense, Food and Beverage Expense, Telecommunications 
Expense, and Other Expense.  The latter contained Administrative and General Expense, 
Marketing and Sales Expense, Energy Expense and Property Operation and Maintenance 
Expense. 
The undistributed general expenses could be expressed as a function of total revenue.  
Over a three-year period, she found the following: 
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Figure 4-5: Undistributed Operational Expenses as a Percent of Total Revenue80  
ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL 10 – 15% 
MARKETING AND SALES 6-8% 
ENERGY 5.5 – 6% 
MAINTENANCE 4.5 – 5.5% 
TOTAL 28 – 32% 
 
Renata felt that with a brand new facility, her maintenance expense would be below the 
average above.  She also felt she could keep administrative and general expenses to a minimum, 
as she herself expected to have a significant presence at the property during the first years of 
operation.  In sum, she thought that her undistributed expenses would fall at the low end of the 
range. 
The distributed expenses were really dependent on the corresponding department 
revenue.  In other words, for example, food and beverage expense were a function of food and 
beverage income.  She noted the following over a three-year period. 
 
Figure 4-6: Departmental Expense as a Percent of Departmental Revenue81 
ROOM EXPENSE 27 – 31% 
FOOD AND BEVERAGE EXPENSE 70 – 75% 
TELEPHONE EXPENSE 99 – 120% 
OTHER 3.5 – 7% 
   
62 
She was puzzled by the telephone revenue and expense relationship.  Why did telephones 
at resorts operate at a loss, when the same item at urban hotels was very profitable?  This would 
require further investigation.  More importantly, she saw that the Food and Beverage expense was 
combined into a single line, but in revenues food and beverage were each accounted for in 
separate lines.  This would create problems for her because, in her budget for Corumbau Lodge, 
the Food Revenue was part of the Room Revenue.  Combining the two expense items would 
throw off both the Room Expense and Food and Beverage Expense calculations.   
Further, how would her higher than average ADR, affect the percentage attributable to 
Room Expense?  Would this be offset by the anticipated lower than average Occupancy Rate?  
Clearly, these Departmental Expenses were not best handled by the simple percentages listed 
above.   
She remembered that her hotel text suggested an elaborate technique that involved 
dividing each expense into fixed and variable components.  The variable component, the part that 
would vary with Occupancy Rate, Food consumed, etc., would be adjusted for expected 
conditions.  The fixed component, the basic cost of providing the service, regardless of the 
volume of it provided, such as the employment of a head of housekeeping or a chef, would be 
added to the variable component82.  This approach would require more time than she had right 
now. 
Renata calculated the total departmental expenses as a function of total revenue.  She 
found that over a three-year period, the percentage was within the range of 47 – 52%83.  She 
adjusted the percentage in accordance with her expectations for operations. 
With income and expense now under control, she had only to quantify the taxes to obtain 
an operating projection.  This was a most unappealing thought, particularly with regard to Brazil, 
where taxes were known to be labyrinthine, not to mention very burdensome.  She wished dinner 
would come soon, so she could take a break. 
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4.10 Tax Issues 
A few days earlier, Renata had asked her attorneys in Brazil to explain the basic tax rules 
applicable to the investment she contemplated.  She wanted to understand both the taxes payable 
at the entity level, and those payable in Brazil by individual investors on account of any cash 
distribution made to them from annual operations or from sale of the property, or as a result of 
any income recognized at the investor level.  She also wanted to evaluate the types of entity most 
suitable from both a legal and tax perspective to hold and to operate the Lodge.  In response, they 
sent her a memo setting forth the most basic elements.  They advised her that tax law in Brazil 
was very complicated, and suggested that she not formalize any decisions about legal and tax 
issues until they had a chance to carefully and deliberately review the options together.  Renata 
read the memo and tried to highlight the issues integral to her Cash Flow Analysis.  She began 
with the taxes due at the entity level.                      
Income and Social Security Tax: Under Brazilian tax law, companies may elect to 
calculate Income Tax (IRPJ) and Social Security Tax (CSLL) liabilities using an Actual Profit 
Method or a Presumed Profit Method.  The election is made annually.  In both Methods, a Tax 
Rate of 25% in the case of IRPJ, and 9% in the case of CSLL, is multiplied by the company 
profits to determine the tax liability.  The difference between the Actual and Presumed Profit 
Methods is that the former uses the actual profits of the company, whereas the later presumes that 
the profits are 32% of the gross revenues.  Companies using the Actual Method follow Brazilian 
accounting rules, which include the right to reduce income by an allowable depreciation expense.  
In the case of buildings, this is normally straight-line depreciation computed based on cost at 4% 
per year84.        
Unemployment Insurance Tax and Welfare Tax: Companies that use the Presumed 
Method pay Unemployment Insurance Tax (PIS) at a rate of .65% of gross revenues, and Social 
Security and Welfare Tax (CONFINS) at a rate of 3% of gross revenues.  Actual Method 
companies pay these taxes at 1.65%, and 7.6%, of gross revenues respectively, but are allowed to 
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reduce the amount paid with tax credits generated by a variety of transactions that arise in the 
ordinary course of business85.   
Service Tax: Homebuilders and some other service companies pay Municipal Services 
Taxes (ISS) at a rate of, usually, 5% of gross revenues86.     
Property Taxes: Entities that own real estate must pay real estate tax.  In the case of urban 
properties, the real estate tax (IPTU) is paid to the municipality.  The tax is a percentage of 
appraised value of the real estate, and varies by municipality.  In some cases, there are extra 
charges for real estate used in economic activities and/or for trash removal.  In the case of rural 
properties, the tax (ITR) is paid to the federal government. The tax is a percentage of appraised 
value of the real estate.  The tax rate varies with size and productivity of the property87. 
Property Transfer Taxes: Buyers of real estate pay transfer taxes (ITBI) to the 
municipality at a rate that varies, but is normally 2% of the sales price.  Buyers are also 
responsible for paying a variety of registry fees which vary from one state to another. 
Real Estate Sale: Taxes from the sale of real estate are normally 15% of the difference 
between the sales price and the depreciated cost basis of the real estate investment.  The tax due 
on sale may vary according to the entity and elections involved.  For example, real estate 
investment funds (FII) are exempt from taxes, and there are circumstances in which a real estate 
company under the Presumed Method may irrevocably elect a special tax regime in which the 
total of Income, PIS, Confins and CSLL is 7% of the gross income including sales revenue88.      
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Figure 4-7: Summary of Taxes at Entity Level89 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the investor level, taxes were somewhat more straightforward.  Dividends paid from 
annual profits were not subject to tax in Brazil.  There was however a tax on financial transfers 
leaving the country known as the Temporary Contribution on Financial Transfers (CPMF) tax, 
calculated as .38% of the funds withdrawn from the bank90. 
Capital Gain is taxed at the investor level to the extent that the funds remitted exceed 
those invested.  The difference is taxed at 15%.  The amount invested is considered the amount 
shown on the foreign investment registration filed with the Central Bank at the time of the 
investment, which registration is required by law.  There is some debate as to whether the 
comparison of the amount invested and the amount remitted would be made in Brazilian or 
foreign currency91.            
At this point, Renata felt she had the tax information pertinent to her DCF Analysis.  She 
did not want to further consider options for legal entity and their implied taxes until she knew 
whether the investors liked the project economics.  If so, she would explore these matters in 
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greater detail, and also propose a deal structure, i.e., the relationship between her compensation 
and sharing of benefits and those of the investors.  Right now, she felt that to do so would be 
premature.   
4.11 Construction Costs 
Renata had ten years of experience as an architect.  Thus, she knew that an architect was 
neither seer nor scientist when it came to construction cost forecasting.  Moreover, in a part of the 
world where the construction practices were unfamiliar, she had no illusions about her ability to 
estimate the costs by herself, never mind run a construction job. 
With the help of friends, she entered into negotiations with an experienced and reputable 
construction manager in Porto Seguro.  Geraldo Andrade was a charming and self-assured 
businessman who would be more than happy to serve as construction manager for this job if it 
went forward.  His fee for the work would be a mark-up of 20% on the labor that went into the 
job, and a mark-up of 20% on materials and subcontracted services that he purchased for the job.  
The hope was that some of the major contracts, such as the contract for the sewer treatment plant, 
could be handled directly by Renata to save the mark-up.  As part of his job, Geraldo would help 
to estimate the construction costs.  Part of the deal with Geraldo, was that the cost of labor would 
not exceed R$150 per square meter. 
Renata had prepared a set of plans (Exhibits A, B, and C) that could serve as a basis for 
estimating the job.  The plan called for constructing the resort campus in a fairly small area of the 
site, allowing most of the site to remain in its natural state, or to be reforested.  The buildings 
consisted of: 1) 9 bungalows (also called cabanas or chalets); 2) the main salon which also housed 
the restaurant; 3) the reception building including accommodations for Renata and for investors 
who may wish to stay at the resort during the busy season when the cabanas were booked, as well 
as the reception offices; 4) another building for staff accommodations; and 5) a laundry. 
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Geraldo had furnished a detailed estimate of the reception building.   It showed a 
materials cost of R$ 529 per square meter including his mark-up.  To this she added the agreed-
upon maximum cost of R$ 150 per square meter for labor, plus the mark-up thereon.  To calculate 
the total for this building, she applied the estimated cost per square meter to the gross area of the 
reception building including outdoor built spaces.   
Renata was concerned about whether this estimate accurately accounted for some of the 
unique aspects of the construction.  For example, in Brazil, walls were normally built of brick 
with a cement skin.  By contrast, this job specified long-forgotten indigenous practices, such as 
making the bricks of clay and sand.  The mixture would be poured into wooden molds that the 
builders would also make.  Similarly, the adobe walls of the cabanas would be built of wood 
strapping with clay and sand on the inside and the outside92.   
These processes, because they were unknown in the industry, would at the outset involve 
a lot of testing.  Different mixtures would have to be allowed to set for weeks to see how they 
hardened, so that the proper mixture could be identified.  What the job would save on the cost of 
bricks, it would incur training, testing and novel procedures93.  Would these costs offset?  
At the same time, she could see that the estimate per square meter for the reception 
building was well above published indices, and that it was being multiplied across the entire area 
including the verandas.   
She then repeated the process for the bungalows, starting with Geraldo’s materials 
estimate for these buildings, including mark-up, of R$ 833.  Again she used the gross floor area 
including outdoor spaces such as decks.  She did not have a materials estimate for the salon.  
Based on the specifications, it seemed reasonable to apply the per square meter estimate for the 
reception building, including materials, labor and mark-up, to the salon. 
She decided that, because the employee housing called for construction typical of the 
area, she would base her estimate on what she understood to be typical recent construction costs 
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of R$ 300 per square meter including materials, labor and mark-up.  She did the same for the 141 
square meter laundry. 
She began to build her construction budget.  At the top she listed the “Administered 
Work” items, those that would be handled by Geraldo, and therefore were subject to a 20% 
charge.  Below these, she listed the services and materials that she herself would buy or contract.   
 
Administered items Sq.  Meters  Budget/ Sq. Meter Budget 
EMPLOYEE HOUSING  300  
LAUNDRY 141 400 56,400 
RECEPTION    
CABANAS    
SALON    
 
SUBTOTAL 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Direct items    
WATER HEATER NA NA 25,000 
GLASS NA NA 60,000 
SEWAGE TREATMENT  NA NA 49,000 
TELEPHONE NA NA 20,000 
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PLANT MATERIALS NA NA 100,000 
ELECTRIC NA NA 100,000 
KITCHEN NA NA 100,000 
EXCAVATION, 
OVERHEAD, 
FURNISHINGS, SOFTAND 
OTHER  
2,955 100 295,500 
 
SUBTOTAL 
 
 
   
749,500 
TOTAL    
CONTINGENCY    
PURCHASE   940,000 
TOTAL LAND AND 
CONSTR 
   
 
As she put the finishing touches on the construction budget, she had the feeling that she 
was forgetting a few things.  Well, she would think of them eventually, and she did have a 
contingency.   
She moved her papers off the tray to allow room for the dinner.  The timing was great.  
All the pieces necessary for her Discounted Cash Flow Analysis were complete, and after dinner 
she would pull them together. 
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5 Risk 
Having completed the DCF Analysis, she wanted to test the sensitivity of the IRR to 
potential variances in expected outcome.  In other words, she wanted to see how the return would 
be affected by setting up scenarios that differed from her expected scenario.  This type of 
Sensitivity Analysis depended first on identifying the sources of risks in the investment, i.e., the 
places where variances may occur.   
The main sources of risk she felt were variances in the ADR, Occupancy Rate, timing 
and construction price.  There were also potential variances in the cap rate used to calculate the 
sale of the property in year 10.  But she was not sure that her investors would limit the risks to 
just these items.   
Investors in foreign countries were often concerned about many other types of risk: 
sovereign risk, political risk, transparency risk, title risk, regulatory risk, exchange control risk, 
contract risk, and so forth.  Her investors were no different.  One of them, for example, had 
expressed concern that Lula would follow the path taken by the leftist presidents of Venezuela 
and Bolivia, who had confiscated private assets without compensation, publicly called for 
resistance to global economic practices, rallied opposition to the institutions supporting those 
practices such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and led a public relations 
campaign against the United States.  According to her investor, since similar problems of misery 
and inequality existed in these countries as in Brazil, and since Lula was the head of the Workers 
Party, Brazil would solve its social problems in the same way.  As another example, her investors, 
like everyone else, had heard the stories of the violent Landless Workers Movement invading 
properties to steal them from the owners.  Weren’t there even laws that gave squatters special 
rights?  There would doubtless be other fears about dubious title, an unworkable legal system, not 
being able to remove money from Brazil, and so forth. 
Renata had looked into all such “risks” to the proposed real estate investment, and found 
them to be as real as the monsters that lay waiting in the Sao Francisco River in Bahia.  To 
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protect against these monsters, River boats, beginning in the late eighteenth century, sported 
carrancas, i.e., terrifying brightly painted sculptures of sharp-toothed, wide-eyed, humanoid 
faces, sometimes hybridized with animals, on their bows94.  Perhaps, she mused, a carranca 
would be helpful in Lisbon.                
To be fair, however, this genre of risk was not altogether fantasy, and Renata had 
concerns of her own.  First, the property sale would be a sale of possession (posse), not a 
conveyance of a title deed.  Possession would allow her use of the property, unless, within a 
statutory period, a title-holder appeared, and brought legal action to remove her.  In that case, she 
and her investors would have no rights to the property, notwithstanding the payment of purchase 
money.  In general, such a purchase was highly inadvisable.  But there was no way around it.  
The Seller had just bought the posse himself.  Moreover, she had learned that it was common in 
some areas of the extreme south of Bahia, such as in Corumbau, for buyers, under certain 
circumstances, to buy possession, and immediately move to “legitimize the possession”, a process 
that would provide title within a few years.  Her attorneys would have to confirm the details, but 
she had grown more comfortable with the concept95.      
Second, she had heard rumors that the land may be subject to Indian claims.  She spent a 
fair amount of time at the FUNAI (the federal department of Indian affairs) offices reading maps 
and discussing the issues with officials.  She had also gone over the situation with the officials in 
the State Tourism Office.  Everyone had assured her that there were no such valid claims.  She 
was satisfied, but she would have to satisfy the investors. 
The principal challenge in dealing with questions of perceived risk, was time.  Investors 
liked simple, clear, well reasoned presentations that took no more than 20 minutes.  Their 
concerns, however, could not be dismissed quickly.  To evaluate these concerns, she herself had 
spent weeks researching the history and current state of land use and land rights in Brazil.  She 
had spoken at length with real estate attorneys and with scholars about the political, regulatory 
and legal risks of real estate investments.   
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She decided that, rather than try to cover the risks comprehensively in a presentation, she 
would put her extensive notes into a memo form, and hand it out to investors. Whether they read 
it or not, they would at least know that the issues had been thoroughly investigated, and the risks 
weighed.  She spent an hour or so writing the memo.   
5.01 Memo: Brazil Real Estate/Country Level Risk Analysis of Legal, 
Regulatory and Political Issues 
 
Memorandum 
 
Date: March, 2003 [Revised 2007] 
To: Investors 
Re: Brazil Real Estate/Country Level Risk Analysis of Legal, Regulatory and Political Issues 
 
The intent of this Memo is to assess the risks that foreign investors face in Brazil’s 
emerging real estate markets.  A country-level analysis of real estate risk is a first stage analysis 
that, if encouraging, may motivate a second stage examination of the country’s more specific 
geographic/product market risks, such as, for example, risks in the Sao Paulo retail space market.  
A further step, if warranted, would analyze a specific investment opportunity.  This Memo deals 
with only the first stage analysis, that is, it seeks to understand Brazil’s country-level real estate 
risk in order to better judge whether its ex ante unlevered real estate returns, which are relatively 
higher than returns available in more developed countries, merely reflect higher risks or signify 
actual arbitrage opportunities.   
 
As to arbitrage, economic theory holds that well-developed markets are informationally 
efficient.  If all participants have the same information, then prices are bid up competitively until 
investment returns and risks match.  It is possible, however, that in less developed markets, 
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foreign investors do not have accurate and complete information, and therefore may exaggerate 
the risks, or believe the risks to be incalculable. In that case, some investors would be deterred 
from investing by the opacity of a market, leaving those who are able to penetrate the foreign 
business, political and legal environment to earn systematic excess returns, i.e., arbitrage. 
 
Recently, there have been several attempts to capture country-specific real estate risk in 
the form of real estate risk indices.  A risk index allows investors to compare risk ratings among 
countries, and should, in theory, be useful to narrow the field of potential targets for international 
investment96.  However, risk indices at this point have significant shortcomings that render them 
suspect.  These flaws in the way indices are constructed, which are discussed in the appendix to 
this Memo, beg for another approach to risk evaluation.   
 
The approach taken here is relatively straightforward.  Brazil’s country-level real estate 
risk is composed of risks in its legal, regulatory and political systems.  This Memo will look at 
those systems from a present day and an historical perspective, and analyze the risks or perceived 
risks arising from them1.  The historical perspective is needed because the systems in question 
have evolved in response to a political history of conflict and compromise. This history must be 
considered in order to form a reasoned judgment about the systems and the risks, if any, that they 
pose.  Moreover, a longitudinal analysis helps to reveal the long-term trends in these risk factors 
much the way a time series analysis reveals long-term trends in a variable under study, and allows 
econometric inference about its future direction.  The analysis will draw conclusions about the 
                                                     
1 The analysis will focus on land and land rights, in part because, for reasons discussed in the 
section on land use regulations, real estate investment in Brazil is primarily investment in real estate 
development projects involving acquisition and permitting of land, and new construction thereon. 
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perception of country-level risk in Brazilian real estate, and the extent to which these perceived 
risks have a basis in fact.    
 
Longitudinal Analysis 
 
The most striking feature of land ownership in Brazil today is its extreme inequality.  
Issues that concern some investors weighing options in Brazil, relate to popular conceptions, or 
misconceptions, of how the State responds or may respond to such pronounced inequality.  The 
questions of land ownership concentration and the proper role of government, if any, in 
addressing land inequality, have roots in early Colonial Brazil.  That is where this analysis begins. 
 
1500 – 1550 
  
There were two significant land rights decrees issued during the very early colonial 
period.  The first was issued in 1532, shortly after the Portuguese, the first Europeans to arrive on 
the shores of Brazil, made their landfall in 1500.  The Portuguese Court established a land rights 
policy based on a system that had successfully settled the Madeira Islands97.  That policy, known 
as capitanias hereditarias, divided the Brazilian coast into fourteen provinces.  The Crown 
granted the land to twelve proprietary captains (two captains got two provinces each) all of whom 
had court connections98.  It did so with the expectation that the captains would establish 
settlements there.  However, the income that the Court expected to derive by sharing in the 
provinces’ Brazil wood profits fell short of expectations.  By mid-century, two of the captaincies 
were abandoned altogether by their grantees, two provinces were successful, two were complete 
failures, three were failing quickly and the remaining five were nothing to write home about99.   
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Accordingly, the Court reclaimed the authority it had granted to the captains, re-
purchased some of the land, and established a governor for the whole colony in 1550.  By that 
time, the principal crop in Brazil was cane sugar100.   
 
In an effort to encourage sugar production, the Crown issued its second land rights decree 
in 1550.  It offered large land grants, known as seismarias.  These granted the holder complete 
property rights in the land, provided that the holder use the land productively.101  This productive 
or beneficial use condition of ownership is a feature that remains embedded in the Brazilian 
outlook on land rights.  It periodically fades from view and resurfaces, most recently and 
explicitly in the current version of Brazil’s constitution.       
 
1550 – 1822 
 
Silence is the most prominent feature of this nearly three-hundred-year history in land 
rights.  During this period, the colony depended on land for its revenues, shifted its principal use 
of land three times, multiplied its population by more than ten, forced ranchers and subsistence 
farmers away from the coast to open land for the mono-cultural export crop of the moment, 
penetrated its frontiers in search of gold, generated large movements of population, battled the 
French, Dutch and Spanish to the death for control of land, and incurred a major scientific 
expedition to the interior to establish new international land borders.102  Yet, there is no evidence 
of any development in domestic land rights.   
 
One might argue that the Seismaria system was so effective that there was no need for 
change.  In fact, however, eligibility under the Seismaria system was widely inapplicable.  In the 
context of the sugar economy, Brazil’s principal economy for almost a century beginning in about 
1550, the beneficial use condition allowed only those with the significant capital required to start 
76 
a sugar mill to apply for seismaria, and therefore to own land103.  Thus, the many ranchers and 
small farmers who worked land to the interior of the sugar plantations along the coast, and 
provided food for the coastal towns, had no title to the land they worked.  They were squatters.  
As such, they were forced off their lands to more interior locations as the sugar economy 
expanded inland.  Indeed, the only reason we know about this population, which may well have 
been in the majority, is because of tension and conflict that erupted between them and the coastal 
towns104.  The Seismaria system did not regulate land use for much of the population.  Instead 
land use, but not ownership, was obtained by squatting (posse) and held by observed social 
norms105. 
 
The Seismaria system was an equally ill-suited tool for land governance as the population 
resettled inland, drawn to Minas Gerais by the gold rush that began in about 1700.  By 1750 the 
greatest concentration of Brazil’s rapidly growing population was no longer in the coastal 
areas106.  The Population began shifting again as the gold boom declined in 1760.  But land rights 
for Brazil’s population remained essentially non-existent.  
 
In 1822 Brazil established its independence and abolished the seismaria system, but it 
established no new land policy at that time.  Land use continued to be acquired by posse and held 
either by social norms or by the potential for force.  The result was the formation of large estates 
or latifundia107.   Thus, from the early colonial period through Brazilian independence, land 
ownership was concentrated by government grants of large parcels to either wealthy or well 
connected grantees, and by the lack of a land rights policy, which allowed those who could 
possess and defend large areas of land, de facto rights in those lands. 
 
It is important to understand that Brazil did not establish its independence in a revolution 
against an overseas monarchy.  In a series of remarkable events, Brazil ended up importing the 
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Portuguese Court to Rio and making Brazil the center of the empire.  In other words, the 
Brazilian response to the problem of “taxation without representation” that rallied the colonies in 
North America to revolution, was to move the entire Portuguese government to the tropical 
colony of Brazil and (eventually) set up a constitutional monarchy there.  Brazil was motivated to 
choose this route in part because its elite, a landed elite, feared that a revolution undertaken in the 
name of liberty would challenge the institution of slavery, on which the elite depended108.  Thus, 
the Brazilian elite brought the monarchy into its own sphere, preserved royal power, continued 
the institution of slavery, and headed off any nonsense about liberty and equality for all, in a 
single gesture.  The importance of these events for the development of land rights will soon be 
seen.         
 
1822 through 1888   
 
Brazil did finally pass a land law in 1850.  There are two different stories as to how this 
came about.  Brazil’s coffee economy began in the 1820’s in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and 
spread subsequently to Sao Paolo and Minas Gerais .  By 1835, Brazil was the largest coffee 
producer world wide.  Coffee production, unlike sugar cultivation, was not so capital intensive, 
and therefore was available to small entrepreneurs.  According to one version of the story, the 
absence of a land policy led to conflicts as increasing coffee prices drove up the value of the land.  
Politicians were asked to clarify land claims.  The response was Land Law 601 of 1850109.   
 
Another version of the story argues that the law was not the least interested in clarifying 
land rights or resolving conflicts between private land claimants.  Its sole purpose was to 
document the lands free of private claims, and therefore property of the Empire.  According to 
this version of the story, the government was intent on inventorying public lands so that it could 
offer parcels to possible immigrants as an enticement to move to Brazil.  That, in turn, had been 
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motivated by the widespread recognition that slavery was in its final days and therefore the 
Brazilian elite needed another source of labor.110   
 
The second version of the story is the more persuasive.2  Moreover, the Land Law of 
1850 did not clarify land rights, provide governance or clear a path toward a more equal 
distribution.  In fact, it worsened the inequality as described below. 
  
The new law:  1) legalized existing posses; 2) validated all sesmarias previously granted; 
and 3) prohibited future posses for acquisition of land.  The first two provisions, in effect, 
legitimized the unequal concentration of land ownership.  The third provision prohibiting posse 
was, in practice, impossible to enforce on the frontier where it remained the principal means of 
settlement111.  However, though posse continued as a means of using land on the frontier, the 
third provision made clear that the only path to ownership (rather than just use) was by 
purchasing land.  That insight gave rise to the practice of landgrabbing (grilhagem) as a means to 
a acquire ownership of large tracts of land throughout Brazil112.   It worked like this: 
 
“The term grilagem de terras arose to describe a stratagem used at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Brazilian literature reveals how title counterfeiters placed their 
falsified deeds into drawers with crickets (grilo in Portuguese).  The drawers were kept 
closed for several weeks.  During this time, the insects decomposed on paper, emitting a 
tobacco-brown fluid which the falsifiers used to reproduce the characteristics of antique 
paper, making it appear as if it had been produced many years before (Lobato, 1948).  The 
                                                     
2 Nugent and Saddi  point out that the Law was passed two weeks after the Eusebio de Queiroz 
law that stopped slave importation, and its supporters argued explicitly that quick passage of the Law was 
required due to the end of slavery.         
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terms grilagem (landgrabbing) and grileiro (landgrabber) are entries in leading Brazilian 
dictionaries.”113. 
 
It is important to note that the practice of landgrabbing did not end in the nineteenth 
century.  It has continued through the present in ever more sophisticated forms, i.e., without 
crickets.   
 
1888 - 1920  
 
In 1888 Brazil officially ended slavery.  Even the Emperor had heartily endorsed 
abolition in a letter he signed with the pseudonym “the Philanthropist”114.  The irony that Brazil’s 
king failed to appreciate was that, from the perspective of the Brazilian elite, the main reason to 
preserve the monarchy was to preserve slavery, as indicated above.  By endorsing abolition, the 
monarch was indeed acting philanthropically.  He came another step closer to giving away his 
empire.   
 
Indeed, in 1889, the Brazilian military provided him transportation to the harbor, and sent 
him packing115.  Like virtually all transitions in Brazil’s history, the transition from monarchy to 
republic was bloodless and seamless.     
 
In connection with land rights, the important factor in the transition is that royal rights 
and power did not really disappear with the departure of the royal family.  While the elites 
appeared to establish a Republic, they really sublimated the powers of the monarchy in an elite 
oligarchy.  They did this by creating a federation of states with significant independent powers, 
maintaining control over the states by ensuring their own election as governors, and cooperating 
with one another to choose the president of the Republic.  Since Brazil was still very much an 
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agricultural country, the elite controlled large land holdings, and ran the country with those 
interests in mind.               
 
In that spirit, the newly formed republic of Brazil issued new land laws that did not 
change land distribution.  The substance of the new laws was to: 1) legalize the right to claim 
public land by posse, and to obtain title to that land upon cultivation for one year; 2) legalize the 
right to use unproductive private land by posse, and, if not contested by the private ownership, the 
right to legal title after five years of use; 3) place public lands in the hands of state governments 
(except for country borders and, later, lands in the Amazon)116.   
 
Placing public lands in the control of the states invited state governors to grant land in 
return for political favors.  Legalizing posse as a means to obtain ownership of land, was useful to 
elite landowners with the power to take and protect land by force.  Indeed these changes led to 
extensive squatting and violent evictions.  Coupled with the problems of unequal land 
distribution, overlapping land grants, land grabbing and slow titling processes, the new laws 
planted the seeds of conflict.    
 
1920 - 1945  
 
Agrarian conflict, however, was manageable by the agrarian elite.   All was well, 
provided the elite oligarchs cooperated.  In the 1920’s, however, conflict among the oligarchs 
grew.  The reasons for this are complex and not germane to this analysis, except to mention that 
Sao Paulo had pulled ahead of the other states in modernizing and industrializing.  The conflict 
among the elite families led to a coup that in 1930 installed the losing presidential candidate, 
Getulio Vargas to power, amid charges of voter fraud (which was actually standard procedure and 
very useful while the elites got along).  Vargas, who was from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, 
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remained in power until 1945 at times establishing legitimacy and at times through a strong 
relationship with the military that supported a strong federal government.  By installing his own 
overseers in each state, Vargas built a strong central government, in effect reclaiming much of the 
monarch’s power to himself.  The details of Vargas’ fifteen year rule are fascinating, but what is 
important to note for this analysis is that Vargas primarily focused on national, urban and foreign 
policy issues.  But Brazil was still an agrarian society.  In 1940, 2/3 of the population still lived in 
rural areas117.  The fact that no significant land reform legislation was passed under Vargas does 
not seem to have been inadvertent.  Vargas himself was an elite landholder.  Skidmore points out 
that after Vargas returned to private life, “Vargas had the sympathy of fellow landholders, who 
were grateful he had never threatened the existing system of land tenure.”  Vargas, who had been 
deposed by another bloodless coup, was able to win a popular election, in part because of his 
support from landholders118.  
 
1946 - 1980 
The Constitution of 1946 introduced the idea of expropriation of unproductive private 
farms119.  Thus, the idea of productive use as a condition for land ownership, which first made its 
appearance in 1550 as a condition for seismaria, reappeared in the middle twentieth century.  
 
The resurfacing of the beneficial use criterion reflects in part the growing visibility of 
land reform as an issue on the political agenda of the 1940’s and 1950’s.  By the 1960’s the need 
for land reform was widely acknowledged, and the debate focused on specific approaches.  In 
1964 a military coup took control of government.  Military control was precipitated in part by 
concern among the elite about land reform proposals that would not provide full compensation for 
government expropriated land120.  The military dictatorship itself saw the need for land reform, 
and passed the Land Statute in 1964 which allowed the federal government to expropriate land, 
with compensation, to achieve a social good.  The idea of taking private land for fair value, and 
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redistributing the land into private hands, is the framework that has given direction to the agrarian 
reform policies of the civilian governments that followed121. 
 
Military rule lasted twenty-one years.  By 1970, the military government had shifted 
priorities away from land reform.  It focused on modernizing agriculture through technology and 
tax breaks.  It dealt with the demand for land reform by repressing workers rather than by settling 
them.  Modernization of agriculture created unemployment among rural workers many of whom 
moved to the urban edges to become seasonal farm workers for agribusinesses.  In this period, the 
public voice of rural workers was the Confederacao Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura 
(CONTAG), the farm workers union.  The union role, however, was limited.  More important was 
the Catholic Church, which formed the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) in 1975.  The CPT 
helped mobilize rural workers, train leaders, legitimize resistance, and encourage a more 
confrontational approach to rural activism122.   
 
1980 – 1994 
 
In the 1980’s things got more complicated.  Hydro-electric dam construction in many 
parts of the country dislocated small farms resulting in both demands for compensatory damages, 
and in protest against forced displacement.  Tax and credit motivated expansion of the cattle 
industry destroyed native forests in the frontier states stimulating protests by rubber workers and 
environmentalists.  Increasingly there was confrontation between small farmers and 
agribusinesses over a variety of matters.  Rural workers suffered and sought to make their 
conditions more visible to the general public.  Most importantly, the grassroots Movement of 
Landless Rural Workers (MST) was born in 1984, just as military rule was winding to a close123.  
MST took advantage of the re-democratization of the Country to implement its strategy of violent 
occupation of private unproductive farms.  MST was to achieve worldwide recognition and media 
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attention, and to become the most important actor in the land reform movement.  The objectives 
and strategies of the MST will be discussed at some length in the section on risk of expropriation. 
 
In 1985, civilian government resumed.  The Sarney administration appointed advocates 
of land reform to head the principal land reform agency INCRA and MIRAD.  The result was the 
proposal for a National Agrarian Reform Plan (PNRA).  The proposed PNRA was an intensified 
version of the Land Statute.  It proposed to compensate land owners for expropriated land at the 
land’s declared value for tax purposes, which was almost always well below market value.  It 
proposed a progressive tax on underutilized land, and the reclamation of public lands that had 
been illegally titled as private holdings.  The proposal’s objective was to settle 7 million landless 
households of the then existing 10.5 million households over fifteen years.  The proposal was 
endorsed by CONTAG, but met with resistance from both the left and the right.  The MST in 
particular had no confidence that the government would expropriate and redistribute significant 
land.  The MST was right.  The landowners were able to negotiate changes to the Plan including 
an exemption from expropriation for any farm in production, regardless of its size. (In other 
words, as long as some part of the farm was productive, all associated landholdings were 
exempt).  As a consequence, only 140,065 families were settled between 1985 and 1994, a lower 
order of magnitude than intended124.   
 
Thus, in the re-democratization period following the end of military rule, the conditions 
of rural workers, their need for land, and the inequality of land ownership, became publicly 
visible issues.  Brazil adopted a new Constitution in 1988, its current Constitution, which again 
weakened central power and distributed these rights to the states, where they were controlled in 
large part by elites.  However, the Constitution also addressed the need for land reform very 
directly as will be discussed in both the section on Squatter Risks and Expropriation Risks below.   
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1994 – 2002 
 
The Cardoso government took control in 1995 with agrarian reform high on its priority 
list, and a plan to settle 280,000 families in the administration’s first term.  The top priority, 
however, was stabilizing the economy and fighting inflation.  Agrarian reform quickly fell by the 
wayside.  The neo-liberal government was more interested in stimulating the growth of 
Agribusiness and therefore Agro-exports, to generate a positive balance of trade, than it was in 
developing family farming.  In reaction, the MST accelerated the pace of occupations. That 
resulted in high profile massacres bringing domestic and international pressure on the Cardoso 
government.  The MST then staged a massive three-month march on the capital from across the 
country, which brought front page news coverage to land reform and stimulated an anti-
government movement125.   
 
In response, the Cardoso government sought to take the initiative for agrarian reforms 
from the MST.  The administration passed a series of measures designed to reduce the cost and 
increase the pace of expropriation.  It passed another set of laws to de-claw the MST.  In 
particular, the administration passed laws prohibiting the expropriation of properties that had 
been invaded, prohibiting the distribution of public funds to anyone who participated in an 
invasion, and suspended negotiations on any issue in connection with the occupation of a public 
building.  It also charged and imprisoned MST leaders for a variety of alleged misdeeds126.   
 
More importantly, the government shifted the conversation about agrarian reform in the 
direction of market led agricultural reform (MLAR) based on the World Bank proposals that 
encouraged direct negotiations between landless workers and landowners, accompanied by 
financing and technical assistance to enable land acquisition and successful agriculture.  This was 
a marked departure from the redistributive reform the MST encouraged.  (It also created tension 
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within the ranks of the agrarian reform movement because CONTAG supported the government’s 
principal program and MST did not).  The program details are not terribly important here.  
Suffice it to say that the success of MLAR under Cardoso is still hotly debated127.  Clearly, 
however, Cardoso did not have a significant impact on the concentration of land ownership.  
Looked at from the perspective of the Gini coefficient measuring land concentration in Brazil at 
.842 in 1960, and .843 in 1998, these efforts were unsuccessful128. 
  
The more important outcome of the debate over state-led v. market-led reform was the 
alignment of the neo-liberal government with the moral position of the landed elite in de-
legitimizing the MST struggle as undeserving, seeking a handout and avoiding hard work.  For 
both the agrarian elites and the neo-liberal reformers, property rights are evidence of self-reliance 
and playing by market rules.  However, the notion that ownership in property is the natural 
consequence of hard work and faith in markets is a distortion of the whole history of land grants 
to those with court connections, land grants to those with large capital, land grants for those with 
State political connection, taking land by force and landgrabbing by title deed forgeries and other 
techniques, and land handouts to immigrants to attract a labor force.  Nevertheless, the alignment 
of the neo-liberal reform and the moral position of the landed elite caused an important shift to 
the right in the public attitude toward land redistribution and other government-led policies to 
redress inequality129.              
 
2003 - Present 
 
Lula, the Workers Party candidate whom the MST had strongly supported and who 
featured quick large-scale agrarian reform prominently in his platform, was inaugurated in 
January 2003.  First on his agenda, however, was not agrarian reform, but rather a campaign to 
end hunger.  Then he slashed the INCRA budget for land acquisition of land (as well as slashing 
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other social programs) in order to reach the budget surplus targeted by the IMF.  He was slow to 
appoint the technical commission that would draft the new agrarian reform plan for the 
government (PNRA – II).  Few families were settled in 2003130 
 
The Lula government’s reform objectives were very similar to those of the Cardoso 
administration in that both wanted to create sustainable settlements that would provide jobs and 
raise incomes for rural workers.  The new plan contained the additional objectives of social 
inclusion and diversity.  In that regard it required title deeds in the name of  couples regardless of 
marital status, increased availability of credit for rural women, sought to identify the title and 
historic landholdings of Quilombo communities, prioritized the marking of Indian territories and 
the removal and resettlement of non-indian squatters from those territories, targeted assistance to 
populations displaced by large government infrastructure projects such as dam construction, and 
promoted environmental issues.  The government abolished Cardoso’s MLAR programs, but 
included new MLAR programs in cooperation with the World Bank.  The emphasis, however, 
was on state-led reform through expropriation and resettlement rather than on MLAR.  The Lula 
government planned to increase the package of loans and technical assistance that would 
accompany resettlement to assure an above-poverty living standard for the beneficiaries of 
resettlement.  Thus it placed a higher priority on the quality of the result, than on the quantity of 
people resettled.  It also wanted to focus resettlement efforts in state identified zones that were 
appropriate for agriculture.  Above all, Lula maintained the Cardoso model focused on generating 
a trade surplus from Agro-exports.  The Lula government has favored the agribusiness sector and 
is, at the same time, trying to pursue social policies131. 
 
The Lula government has not been very successful in terms of numbers of families 
resettled.  It does seem to have improved the living standards of those resettled under the Cardoso 
administration, and of those it itself resettled.  In addition, it brought electricity to 17,000 rural 
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families on 220 settlements through a national electrification program.  It has developed an 
understanding with the MST.  While the legislation passed by the Cardoso administration 
precluding post-occupancy expropriation remains on the books, the government has recognized 
the agrarian social movement as a partner in defining policy for credit, technical assistance and 
adult education.  The government does not persecute the MST, and in return, the MST agrees that 
it will occupy only public lands so as not to run afoul of the law.  The reform movement appears 
to understand the constraints under which Lula is working.  The government is a coalition 
government which the Workers Party does not control.  To govern, Lula formed a broad-based 
alliance including those opposed to agrarian reform.  His cabinet includes important positions 
filled by those who are opposed to change.  Further, the neo-liberal reforms of the Cardoso 
administration shrunk the INCRA, demoralized its staff and eliminated or privatized programs 
important to the agrarian reform.  So the ability of the government to implement even modest 
objectives was compromised by the dissembling of the machinery of government.  Finally, the 
extremely important Agro-export sector which was traditionally silent on the issue of land reform, 
became strongly opposed to it for their own reasons:  Agribusinesses are now competing with the 
social movement for the unproductive lands.  Thus an industry that is extremely important to the 
economic health of the Country has joined the coalition opposed to land reform132. 
 
There is little doubt about Lula’s sincere commitment to land reform.  What is 
noteworthy is his inability to pull it off, notwithstanding his control of INCRA’s budget and 
appointments.  The results demonstrate the limits of federal authority and the existence of a 
complex set of influences, constraints and political actors that ultimately shape the quality, size 
and pace of land reform133.    Meanwhile, Lula seems to have struck compromises that allow 
Brazil to satisfy super-national institutional requirements, compete in international trade, 
accumulate foreign reserves, grow its Gross Domestic Product, and give appropriate recognition 
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to many different interest groups, while slowly addressing the problem of inequality.  From a 
foreign investment perspective, this is an inviting state of affairs. 
 
As to the overall message of this history, Adam Smith wrote of the invisible hand that 
optimizes economic results notwithstanding the motivations of the individual participants.  If 
there is an invisible hand at work in Brazil, it belongs to the elite, has optimized outcomes for 
landowners for 500 years, and continues to do so.  The elite have shown an uncanny ability to 
read and anticipate the pulse of the country, and to strategically abort virtually any policy 
contrary to its interests, often when the policy is an idea or philosophy in utero.   
 
Some investors fear that the resulting inequality in Brazil will cause the country to follow 
in the footsteps of the self-proclaimed New Bolivarians, Chavez in Venezuela and Morales in 
Bolivia.  In that regard one must remember that Brazil never had an old Bolivar.   
 
Further, unlike Venezuela and Bolivia with powerful central governments and a 
population concentrated in their capital cities, Brazil is disbursed.  Its population and its power 
centers are spread across a giant country larger than the continental U.S., and far more difficult to 
travel.  In part, because of its size and political structure, Brazil was never able to implement the 
extreme measures prescribed by the IMF and economists such as former Harvard economist 
Jeffrey Sax.  Not so with Venezuela and Bolivia. The New Bolivarian movements in those 
countries are, arguably, a reaction to the large doses of medicine they swallowed134.  Further, 
Brazil is unlikely to repudiate globalization.  That is more a worry for the United States.  It is not 
Brazil that is losing vast numbers of jobs because globalization demands manufacturing where 
the factors of production are least expensive.  Brazil is a beneficiary of globalization.   
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Consequently, any concern that Brazil may be ripe for a major revolution, confiscation of 
land or even a major policy shift, is without substance.  Brazil is growing, albeit more slowly in 
the overall than is China.   But, Brazil has been addressing its principal problem of inequality.  
According to The Economist, in Brazil, the poor are in fact “living Chinese growth rates”135.  In 
sum, from the point of view of history, the interests of landowners have been well protected.  
Trends look favorable.  Nevertheless, land reform, whether market- led or state- led, is an 
important feature of current law, and is likely to remain an important feature of the political 
agenda.  Accordingly, the next section looks at the risks posed by the present day laws and 
regulations.       
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
Land rights in Brazil today have a split personality.  On the one hand Article 524 of the 
Civil Code provides title holders the right “to use, enjoy and dispose of the goods, and to receive 
them back from those who unjustly possess them”. 136  Under the Civil Law, and subject to 
paying taxes, land owners can buy, sell, borrow against, rent, develop (subject to land use 
regulations), etc. their real estate as they see fit, much the way they can in the United States.   
Constitutional Law, however, limits those rights in two ways. 
 
Squatter Rights Risks 
 
First, Article 196 of the 1988 Constitution allows for squatters to occupy and claim up to 
50 hectares of vacant private land.  If the squatter occupies the land for five consecutive years 
without protest from the owners, the squatter may secure title to the land.  If the owner opposes 
the squatter and has him evicted, the owner is required to pay the squatter compensation for 
improvements made by the squatter137.  
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In the United States, a provision for squatter rights, referred to as adverse possession, is a 
feature of land rights in most states.  In Massachusetts, for example, Chapter 260 Section 21 
provides that twenty years of continuous, exclusive, open, adverse and notorious possession is 
sufficient to obtain title.  Though five years as required by Brazilian law is a short period in 
which to establish the right to ownership, the concept is not unfamiliar to U.S. real estate 
investors.   
 
Moreover, Brazil’s squatter rights do not pose any particular risk to real estate investors, 
foreign or domestic, except that absentee owners of real estate not under professional 
management, must undertake periodic inspections, and initiate appropriate court action if 
squatting is observed.  Buyers must also make a physical inspection of the property before buying 
to ensure that no one, other than employees explicitly on payroll, is living on the property138.   
 
Special Rights of Adverse Possession 
 
Special rights of adverse possession attach to Quilombolas or slave descendants able to 
demonstrate that their families have continuously occupied a land area since 1888.  In the general 
case of adverse possession, landowners may preclude the squatters’ right to title by raising a 
protest before the five year period has matured.  In the case of Quilombola adverse possession, 
the squatter has the right to title regardless of landowner objections139.                    
 
Expropriation Risks 
 
The second constitutional limitation to the land rights provided under civil law derives 
from the history of the beneficial use condition and of the land reform movement, explained in 
the preceding section.  Articles 189 and 191 vaguely and generally describe the social function of 
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land and authorize the federal government to expropriate land that does not meet the beneficial 
use criterion.  The intent is to allow the government to take private land, and compensate the 
owner in order to give the land to small farmers.  It should be noted, however, that there is 
disagreement about whether the government pays just compensation for the land.  (The arguments 
have been made both ways.)   In any event, the government does not pay in cash, except for any 
land improvements that are expropriated, but rather issues Agrarian Debt Bonds or titulos de 
divida agraria (TDA) that pay over ten years with interest3.  As explained below, none of this 
poses any risk for foreign real estate investors, but it does affect prudent investor behavior as set 
forth below. 
 
The two Constitutional provisions described above, i.e. the provision related to squatting 
and the provision related to productive use, need to be discussed in the context of the activities of 
the MST, an organization world renown for its open and combative invasions of private lands, 
and for the violent confrontations that ensue when a landowner tries to remove them from the real 
estate.  These activities are often misunderstood by foreigners.  First, MST activities have nothing 
to do with Article 196 of the Constitution, i.e., their activities have nothing to do with the 
squatting provision per se.  It is not the intent of the MST to invade private lands and hope that 
the landlord does nothing about it for five years.  On the contrary, the intent of the MST is to 
trigger a government expropriation by inviting the opportunity for violence.  Adverse media 
attention such as a violent MST invasion embarrasses a Brazilian president.  Accordingly, the 
MST motivates the government to intervene before or during a violent eviction by demanding 
that the government begin the desapropriacao or expropriation process, which will normally end 
the violence.  The government needs motivation to act quickly because INCRA, the federal 
agency that handles the mechanics of expropriation is constrained by a limited budget.  
                                                     
3 There is conflicting information about whether the term is ten years or twenty years. 
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Expropriations follow carefully scripted processes and judicial procedures that are costly and time 
consuming.  Normally the imissao de posse or distribution to squatters includes various subsidies, 
lines of credit and training programs to help the new entrepreneurs survive140. 
 
How does the expropriation risk affect real estate investment?   
 
First, it is important to remember that land reform is an agrarian issue.  The risk of MST-
prompted government expropriation of a small development parcel in the middle of Sao Paulo is 
small.  Further, compensation for urban land taken by eminent domain has typically been 
excessive.141       
 
Second, foreign real estate investors who buy agricultural lands for speculation, leaving 
them idle in the meanwhile, are willingly taking on the risk of expropriation.   
 
Third, investors who intend to develop resorts or subdivisions that will leave large 
portions of the land forested must register the environmentally protected area with IBAMA, the 
federal environmental agency.  This registration automatically exempts the area from 
expropriation142.   
 
Fourth, investors in the Amazon region, particularly in the State of Para, should recognize 
that the MST is now active in this area.  Investors in general should be aware if the MST is active 
in the area of their contemplated investment.   
 
Fifth, it is important to record truthful information about the land price.  It is typical for 
sellers to seek agreement with the buyer to a strategy that will allow the seller to underreport the 
sales price, thereby reducing taxes on sale.  It is in the interests of the buyer to ensure that the 
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price is accurately recorded at the registry of deeds for several reasons.  To begin with, providing 
understated price information to the registry is a recipe for problems in determining expropriation 
value because INCRA expropriations require pericias or official appraisals which include data 
from the registry.  Further, the long-term interests of investors is served by transparency in real 
estate markets, and furnishing false information to the only public source of price information 
undercuts efforts for transparency.  Further, it puts the buyer in a precarious tax situation upon re-
sale, virtually guaranteeing that the problem is perpetuated.  (Not to mention that it is illegal and 
dishonest). 
 
Sixth, investors acquiring rural lands in areas where the MST is active should postpone 
closing until they are ready to commence productive use.  If permits are required to develop the 
property, then permits must be obtained before closing so that productive use may begin 
immediately upon closing.  Areas of environmental protection should be registered before 
closing.  The investor should not allow any time for the land to be idle and eligible for 
expropriation under the beneficial use criteria in the Constitution.       
 
Seventh, in the event of an MST invasion, a landowner who wants to prevent 
expropriation should proceed immediately to court143.  The court may be expected to decide the 
case based on the Civil Code and issue a reintegracao de posse authorizing the police to evict the 
squatters.  The courts are not responsible for land reform and will therefore issue the warrant 
independent of whether the claim of unproductive land use is valid.  INCRA, however, is 
responsible for land reform, and it may expropriate land even if the court has ordered eviction.  
The objective of the landowner is to evict the squatters before they can involve INCRA144.  
Therefore, in this race against time, the land owner should act immediately.  On the other hand, 
some investors have found it beneficial to have the land expropriated. 
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Eighth, if INCRA decides to expropriate, the land owner may challenge the taking in 
court by contesting the claim that the land is unproductive.  However, the chances of the MST 
mistakenly invading land that is being used productively or has been registered as an 
environmental area with IBAMA is extremely small.  The MST is a sophisticated organization 
and does not waste its time pursuing land that is ineligible for expropriation.   
 
Ninth, the land owner may challenge the INCRA recommended value.  This, however, 
should not be necessary if the purchase price was accurately registered.  INCRA follows a well 
specified valuation method145.   
 
In sum, the risk of MST invasion of urban land is immaterial.  The risk of MST invasion 
of rural land is similarly remote if the land is productively used, or if unproductive environmental 
areas are registered.  Investors who buy land in areas where the MST is active, and hold the land 
idle, are inviting the risk of expropriation.  Accordingly, except for such cases, the issue of 
expropriation is not a risk to real estate investors.                               
 
Title Risk 
 
Under the Civil Code described above, buyers of real estate may obtain good and 
marketable title to real estate.  Title deeds are registered at the local Registro de Imoveis or 
Registry of Deeds, housed at the local Catoria or notary office.  Registries, though administered 
by the local municipality, operate under federal regulations.  In large cities there may be more 
than one cartoria.  For example, in Sao Paulo, there are eighteen registry offices.  Owners with 
title deeds that have not been registered may be viewed as having no legal claim to sell.  Even 
registered title deeds must be carefully researched by buyer’s counsel.  There is no title insurance 
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available in Brazil, so due diligence typically performed by title insurance companies in the U.S., 
is the responsibility of the buyer in Brazil146.   
 
Unfortunately the practice of grilhagem  or land grabbing through falsified title did not 
end in the nineteenth century147.   It is buyer’s obligation to ensure that the title deed was a valid 
document in the first place, and that there is a clear and registered chain of title.   
 
The buyer must also ensure that two different title deeds do not include the same land.  In 
rural areas, the problem of overlapping land claims, and incorrect plot plans is common enough in 
rural regions that the Country has implemented a new system of rural real estate registration for 
property greater than 10,000 ha.  Currently, buyers are required to have an approved engineer 
perform a certified GPS survey of the lot before buyer can complete the title deed registration.  It 
is possible that the lot area will be less than or greater than the area shown on the previously 
registered plot plan.  It is wise to make the purchase price a function of the undisputed lot area.  
Thus if the lot area is smaller than expected, the price would fall.  If the area were larger, 
however, the buyer, to incorporate the additional area, would have to seek consent of adjacent 
properties to accept the surveyed boundaries.  Such abutter consent may be difficult to secure.  
The requirement of an updated GPS survey is an excellent idea.  The problem with the 
requirement is that it is administered by INCRA, which normally takes about one year to provide 
an approval.  The title deed cannot be recorded without INCRA approval.  Land use approvals 
can be processed simultaneously148. 
 
Because the buyer may need as much as two years to secure both Land Use approvals and 
INCRA approval, there is a risk that by the end of the process, the buyer will no longer be able to 
obtain free and clear title to the property.  The damages arising from that risk are greatest if the 
Buyer closes and pays the full purchase price before obtaining all approvals necessary to register 
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title deed.  For example, it is possible that during the year or more necessary to obtain approvals, 
creditors of the seller could place a lien on real estate because it is registered in the name of the 
seller, even if it has been transferred to the buyer.  As another example, the seller could sell the 
real estate more than once.  Whichever buyer obtains the right to register title deed first would 
own the property.  The buyer to arrive second to the registry would have a claim against the 
seller, but not against the real estate.  The losses from these problems may be avoided by 
postponing payment and closing until all approvals, or at least those approvals necessary to 
register the title deed, are in hand.  In that way, losses, if any, would be limited to the fees and 
costs of obtaining permit.  It is also possible to register the Purchase and Sale Agreement thereby 
notifying the world of the impending sale.  However, even that registration requires the INCRA 
approval149. 
 
Land Use Regulation Risk 
 
Foreign real estate investment in Brazil is weighted toward investment in real estate 
development, not toward buying stabilized properties4.  There are two reasons for this.   
The first is that ownership of single buildings is often composed of separately owned 
units.  To purchase such a building requires negotiations with multiple unrelated parties, which 
empowers the last seller to demand a windfall (Deal and Rossi).   Second, is that development is 
attractive because there is a need for more buildings.  For example, the Economist estimates that 
Brazil has “a shortage of 8 million houses and huge pent-up demand”150. 
 
                                                     
4 The major exceptions to this are retail and industrial properties and corporate real estate. 
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Development, whether in domestic or foreign markets, entails not only land ownership 
risk, but also entitlement risk, i.e., the risk of obtaining permits to build.5  Thus land use 
regulations as well as land ownership law must be scrutinized for risk, if any, posed to investors.   
 
In general there are two kinds of land use regulations.  First, there are municipal zoning 
regulations.  Cities in general will have a plano diretor or master plan that defines allowable uses 
in each zone, and indicates the minimum lot size, lot coverage ratio, floor area ratio, setback 
requirements (though these are generally quite small and sometimes non-existent), and sometimes 
percentage of permeable surface area151. 
 
Second there are environmental regulations issued at the Federal and State levels.  Many 
areas of the Country, particularly areas along the coast are restricted as Area de Protecao 
Ambiental (APA) or Environmentally Protected Areas.  These areas will have another layer of 
land use regulations.  Developers working within an APA must prepare an environmental impact 
study for submission to multiple state and federal agencies.  Securing approval for development 
plans from the various agencies involved may take two to three years.  In general the APA 
regulations are intended to protect important, rare or at-risk ecosystems such as the patches of 
original Mata Atlantica or Atlantic Rainforest that remain along the coast, and Mangrove areas.  
There are also federal and state environmental regulations that prohibit construction in permanent 
preservation areas such as within thirty meters along rivers, lakes and streams, on certain kinds of 
dunes and cliffs, on tops of mountains, in flood plains, and so forth152.  There are also 
environmental reserve requirements for rural lands that establish the percentage of any land area 
that must be kept undeveloped.  The reserve requirements vary from region to region from 
                                                     
5 It also entails contract risk as surveyors, engineers, environmental consultants, contractors, etc. 
must be contracted.  These risks, however, will not be examined in this memorandum.   
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approximately 20% to 80%.  The reserve requirements are in addition to the permanent 
preservation areas.   Landowners file a declaration of the reserve area with IBAMA.  A careful 
study of all environmental requirements is essential to understanding how a site can be 
developed153. 
 
Foreign Ownership Risk 
 
Brazil’s Constitution allows foreigners to own real estate in Brazil.  Previously, 
foreigners were prohibited from owning rural lands, but that changed with the 1988 Constitution.  
On occasion, an ill-informed local registry of deeds official refuses to register title to a foreigner.  
In such a case, a foreigner may file suit and obtain a quick, favorable decision.  Foreigners often 
elect to form, and hold title in the name of, a Brazilian company.  Doing so avoids any possible 
problem since there is no prejudice attached to the national origin of the company’s owners, or 
the source of the country’s capitalization.  Also, holding title in a Brazilian company is a good 
way to own coastal real estate. Private ownership of  the beachfront is prohibited because it is 
considered strategically important to the Brazilian Navy.  However, Brazilians, and Brazilian 
companies, even if 100% foreign owned, may obtain a use permit from the Navy for a small fee. 
As is the case with most bureaucratic processes in Brazil, securing this permit takes time154. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This memorandum has provided a survey of legal, regulatory and political factors that 
may contribute to risk or the perception of risk in Brazil’s real estate market.  It has looked at the 
laws, rights, regulations and politics from an historical perspective, and from a present day 
perspective.  Thus far, no additional risks, as compared with those of developed countries, have 
been identified that would explain the high risk premium paid by Brazilian real estate 
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investments.  No risk premium could or should be paid for features, such as high fees, for 
example, that are just part of the investment landscape. These are not risks.  They do not create 
variance from expectations.  On the contrary, they are known conditions that must adjust the 
expected cash flows.  Similarly, no risk premium could or should be paid for “risks”, such as the 
“risk” of adverse possession, which management may eliminate through its protocols.  Risk 
premium paid in consideration of known or manageable conditions, is arbitrage.   
 
The survey, however, is incomplete.  Country-level political risk must also consider the 
risks of inflation, sovereign debt default, currency stability and exchange control risk.   On the 
surface, however, it is not clear that any of these risks are actually risks to real estate investments.  
Often in countries that have experienced economic turmoil, real estate is the safe asset to which 
investors gravitate, thereby driving up its price.  In Brazil, at the onset of the Cardoso 
administration when inflation was reduced to single digits from what had been 2500% per year, 
the value of real estate in some areas was reported to have dropped by 60%155.  So, there should 
be no automatic assumption that financial turmoil, which may be adverse to stocks and bonds, 
should negatively impact real estate.  More work, however, needs to be done in this area before 
conclusions can be reliably drawn.            
5.02 Appendix A to Memo: Risk Indices 
In general, risk ratings are built up from various components of risk such as country risk, 
transparency, and real estate specific risk.  These components are themselves composed of 
several sub-components.  For example, country risk may be composed of political risk, inflation 
risk, currency risk, balance of payments risk, exchange control risk, discriminatory tax 
regulations, limitations on foreign ownership, capital controls, lack of information, etc.  Each 
subcomponent may be further subdivided.  For example, political risk itself may have several 
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dimensions including frequency of government change, international conflicts, violence, armed 
revolts, default on international debt obligations, etc.156  
 
There are several problems with the above approach.  First, there is enormous potential 
for overlap.  For example, “lack of information” may be double counted as both transparency risk 
and country risk.  The double counting problem is exacerbated by the ‘subcontracting’ of the 
various components.  That is, an index may be composed of country risk as calculated by the 
International Country Risk Guide, transparency risk as calculated by Jones Lang Lasalle Global 
Real Estate Transparency Index, and real estate risk calculated by a third party, none of whom are 
considering the subcomponents already factored into the work of the other.  This may result in 
significantly overweighting a particular dimension.   
 
Second, these indices tend to contain hidden assumptions that may not be true for the real 
estate of any particular country.  For example, country risk includes inflation risk, which may 
make sense for investments in non-indexed bonds, but may not make sense for real estate.  For 
example, when inflation was brought under control in Brazil in the second half of the 199o’s, the 
value of real estate fell as much as 60% in some areas of the country157.  Therefore, a negative 
correlation between real estate investment performance and inflation risk cannot be assumed.  
Similarly, the prospect of foreign debt default is not necessarily harmful to real estate because, in 
many countries, real estate is considered the preferred safe haven when there is trouble in 
financial markets158.  In other words, real estate in some places may in fact benefit from economic 
turbulence, but the indices show the opposite.   
 
Third, the indices tend to confuse risk, which necessarily involves variance from 
expectations, with unproductive features of a country’s business environment that are absolutely 
predictable.  Thus, high or discriminatory tax regulations, or high transaction fees, are not risks.  
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They are realities that must be factored into an investment decision, but do not deserve risk 
premium.  The indices, however, tend to capture these features as part of a country’s risk.    
 
Fourth, related to the problem of including elements that are not risks, is the problem of 
including risk that may be managed away. For example, in Brazil, the risk of losing land to claims 
of adverse possession exists, but may be managed away.  No risk premium could or should be 
expected for such risks because they may be eliminated.  In fact, the existence of risk premium 
for such risks would constitute arbitrage for those with the skill to manage the risk. 
 
Fifth, is the question of how the evaluator came to assign a particular number to a 
particular subcomponent.  In this sense, the rating may not illuminate the question of risk, but 
rather may disguise it.  For example, the Jones Lang LaSalle Global Real Estate Transparency 
Index explains that it assigns numbers based on answers its own managers give to standardized 
survey questions159.  However, the managers’ answers themselves involve a subjective evaluation 
process that is necessarily out of view.  The nature of the risk is not clarified by saying that 
someone else made the evaluation.    
 
Sixth, ratings are a relative measure.  They apply based on how countries compare with 
other countries.  Logically, this may happen in two basic ways.  An evaluator may rank a 
component across all countries to ensure consistency of judgment, or an evaluator may rank only 
countries of his personal expertise, to ensure that judgments are reasonable.  However, unless the 
rating companies employ evaluators whose expertise extends to all countries ranked (sometimes 
over 40 of them), the indices cannot be constructed from both reasoned and consistent judgment. 
### End Memo ### 
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5.03 Sensitivity Analysis 
She reviewed the memo, and concluded that it objectively addressed her investors’ likely 
concerns about risks that were not quantifiable.  It would allow her to focus the presentation on 
the quantitative aspects of risk.  She returned to the question of Sensitivity Analysis. 
The risks she wanted to capture in the Sensitivity Analysis were those market risks that 
real estate investors typically face.  The two primary risks, as she saw it, were those of 1) over-
building; and 2) a decline in demand such as had happened in Brazil over the last two years.  
Either risk could impact Occupancy Rate or ADR, which would impact cash flows and the return.  
She also suspected that inaccuracy was necessarily embedded in the Competitive Index that she 
had assigned to the proposed property because the Lodge would be a new model.  As such, its 
expected performance, derived by difficult comparison with that of other properties in the 
Competitive Set, was only roughly estimated.    
For each risky input to the DCF model, such as, for example, Supply growth, Demand 
growth and Competitive Index, she would determine a probable interval over which the results 
would range.  Using the high and the low of each range, she would re-calculate the IRR. 
She considered the simple example of a hotel with an expected ADR of R$ 530, and a 
likely variance of 10% above or below the expected result160.  Under those conditions, the “best 
case” ADR would be R$ 583, and the worst case, R$ 477.  In sequence, the high and low figures 
for ADR could be substituted into the Discounted Cash Flow Analysis model for this particular 
example (not shown here), yielding, in each case, a different cash flow and IRR.  Entering the 
highest ADR in the probable range resulted in an IRR of 22.4%.  The low of the range yielded an 
IRR of 17.8%.  The IRR of other points in the ADR interval could be checked as well.  The table 
below provides a simple compilation of these results.    
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Figure 5-1: Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis161  
IRR  of Hotel 
Variation in the ADR of the Hotel 
-10% -5% 0 +5% +10% 
R$ 477 R$ 504 R$ 530 R$ 557 R$ 583 
IRR %  
17.8% 19.0% 20.2% 21.3% 22.4% 
 
Renata thought carefully about the inputs to vary.  Did it make sense, for example, to 
start by varying the Occupancy Rate, or rather to start at an earlier point in the Feasibility 
Analysis, and vary, for example, the CAGR for supply? 
When she completed the analysis, she had several individual tables showing a range of 
returns, each obtained by isolating a single input and examining the effects of testing its 
reasonable limits.  In reality, however, several of these individual effects could happen together.  
The combinations could exaggerate or mitigate the variance in the return.   She considered 
whether she should, and how she might, capture combined effects of varying the inputs.  She also 
wondered what these results meant in terms of the risk to her investors.  How could she help them 
to weigh the expected return vs. the variance in the expected return, against that trade-off in other 
potential investments? 
It bothered her that her analyses sought to ascertain information about the ex ante return 
yielded by the proposed investment, whereas DCF analysis normally aimed to discover the Net 
Present Value of the Investment.  However, her attempts in that direction had failed for lack of a 
systematic approach to determining the appropriate opportunity cost of capital, i.e., the discount 
rate, for a development deal of this kind.  In this regard, she was stymied. 
Now having completed the DCF and Sensitivity Analysis for the investment, she 
examined the results, and pondered their meaning.  How did the results obtained from the DCF 
and Sensitivity Analysis relate to her international and macro-economic analysis of the market?  
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Was there anything in the DCF analysis that captured the benefits that she anticipated from a 
stronger currency in Brazil, from increased FDI, from lower interest rates, or from growth in the 
domestic economy of Brazil?  In sum, did her quantitative results fit the picture that had emerged 
at each level of the market analysis?  If not, should she do anything about it? 
When she felt satisfied with the answers to those questions, she prepared a complete 
report of analysis and conclusions.  Using that as a guide, she assembled a fifteen minute power-
point presentation for her investors.  The presentation would consist of ten to fifteen slides that 
would most effectively communicate her recommendation and reasoning.  Then, confident that 
she had considered every angle, she allowed herself to relax.  She could feel the plane begin its 
descent.       
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Part 2  
6 The Intervening Period 2003 - 2007  
The Lodge at Corumbau opened its doors in January 2006 to wide critical acclaim.    
Brazil’s preeminent style magazine, Casa Vogue immediately grasped the import of this new 
addition to Bahian lodging, and celebrated it with a long article and enticing photographs in its 
September 2006 issue.  Europe’s chic journal “Wallpaper” also featured it in the October 2006 
issue, as did other world press.  Reviews of the Lodge indicated that its design used an earthy and 
indigenous architectural vocabulary to create a composition that was sleek, charming, 
comfortable and respectful of the natural beauty around it.  In a word, it was appropriate.  Renata 
was rightfully proud of her accomplishment (See photographs in Exhibit 38).   
6.01 Entitlements 
Two permits were required to build on the site: a building permit, issued by the 
municipality; and an environmental permit, issued by the federal agency IBAMA.  The former 
was handled efficiently by her consultant who submitted the plans to the mayor’s office, which 
provided her a permit within thirty days.  Environmental permitting took longer.  She met with 
IBAMA at the outset to discuss details of the process and negotiate the waterline set-backs.  
Normally, the relationship with IBAMA is governed by whether the site is within an 
Environmentally Protected Area (APA) or not.  If not, permitting is rapid; if so, the process is 
prolonged162.  Renata found, however, this site had a different designation altogether.  Because of 
its proximity to the National Park, it was given a Park Area designation, which required extensive 
environmental studies to be completed by licensed engineers, and submitted to IBAMA.  The 
normal waterfront set-back requirement was thirty meters, however, Renata’s site was set on a 
small cliff overlooking the beach, which mandated a 100 meter set back163.  Renata pointed out 
the low density of her development, and the proposed sewer treatment plan and reforestation 
106 
project, and negotiated with IBAMA to reduce the set-back to sixty meters.  She was given oral 
authority to proceed approximately six months after submission to IBAMA of the environmental 
reports, but it took several years to obtain the permit. 
6.02 Construction 
As planned, Renata hired Geraldo as the construction manager, and also found a builder 
named Alfonso to work under Geraldo’s supervision.  Alfonso was a carpenter and had five 
employee carpenters on his payroll.  He would supply the job with labor and some subcontractors 
such as the plumber.  His charges for these services would be submitted to Geraldo, who added 
the cost of materials, and added his 20% fee.  As time went on, Renata bought more of the 
materials herself to save the mark-up.   Renata contracted with other “subs” directly, including 
the electrician, excavator, sewer treatment contractor, air conditioning contractor, water-heater 
installation, glass, fire retardant for the roof of the cabanas, telephone system, landscaper, 
reforestation contractor, and restaurant kitchen.  In addition she had design professionals, such as 
the lighting consultant and the landscape architect working under her.  Since the job was in a 
remote location, and the workers set up temporary housing to live on site, Renata incurred various 
overhead expenses that would not be typical of an urban job, such as, for example, providing 
food. 
Renata was at the job every day supervising.  This was particularly important in 
connection with the indigenous building practices described in section 4.11, and pictured in 
photographs in Exhibit 39.  Geraldo, on the other hand, was located too far away to make site 
visits practical.  During the early phase of construction all went well, however, during the months 
of June and July, Renata had to be away from the job.  When she returned, she found that labor 
charges had been incurred for every day of the period, but there had been no progress whatsoever.  
Since Geraldo had promised her that the cost of labor would not exceed R$ 150 per square meter 
as indicated in section 4.11, he agreed to postpone any further payment of his mark-up on either 
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labor or materials until the final labor costs were quantified.  The budgeted and actual 
construction costs are shown in Figure 6-1. 
 
                                           
 
Figure 6-1: Budgeted and Actual Construction Costs 
Administered items Sq.  Meters  Budget/ Sq. Meter Budget Actual 
EMPLOYEE HOUSING 277 300 83,100 96,130 
LAUNDRY 141 300 42,300 62,470 
RECEPTION 707 709 501,263 826,930 
CABANAS 1170 1013 1,185,210 1,281,260 
SALON 660 709 467,940 721,400 
 
SUBTOTAL 
 
 
 
 
  
2,279,813 
 
3,044,076 
Direct items     
WATER HEATER NA NA 25,000 25,000 
GLASS NA NA 60,000 63,000 
FIRE RETARDANT   0 80,000 
SEWAGE TREATMENT  NA NA 49,000 49,000 
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TELEPHONE NA NA 20,000 21,000 
GARDEN   0 20,000 
PLANT MATERIALS NA NA 100,000 100,000 
REFORRESTATION   0 100,000 
ELECTRIC NA NA 100,000 100,000 
ILLUMINATION   0 70,000 
KITCHEN NA NA 100,000 100,000 
EXCAVATION, 
OVERHEAD, 
FURNISHINGS, SOFTAND 
OTHER  
2,955 100 295,500 557,924 
 
 
SUBTOTAL 
 
 
   
749,500 
 
1,015,924 
TOTAL   3,029,313 4,060,000 
CONTINGENCY   106,026  
PURCHASE   940,000 940,000 
TOTAL LAND AND 
CONSTR 
  4,075,338 5,000,000 
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The construction statement reflected the initial cost for the reforestation, but there would 
also be an ongoing cost as the project continued over time.  Despite the significant cost overruns, 
her commitment to the reforestation project was unwavering.  Nor did she skimp on other aspects 
of the job.  For example, she hired a first-rate illumination consultant, and a top-notch landscape 
designer.  The results spoke for themselves. 
As an operator, Renata was committed not only to environmental sustainability, but to the 
sustainability of the surrounding community, and so she hired and trained local people whenever 
possible.  Her priority, however, was her guests for whom she personally ensured a rewarding 
experience.  The Corumbau Lodge was exactly the kind of development that the State of Bahia 
was eager to develop: upscale, eco-friendly and community supportive164.  From all angles, 
Renata seemed to be doing everything right.   
Everything, that is, except for one thing.  She was not making money.  While the losses 
were not staggering on a cash basis, they were quite large if you factored Renata’s two years 
without salary or days off, and her unpaid architectural and development fees.  The returns to 
date, however, were a far cry from the strong performance she and her investors had envisioned.  
Not only did she receive no return on her labor and entrepreneurship, the investors received no 
return on their capital.  This was not a tenable situation, and Renata knew that she needed to do 
something about it quickly.  
She spoke frequently on the phone with her close Brazilian friend Roberto who she knew 
from childhood family vactions to Brazil.   At about the same time, they had both left secure jobs 
to become entrepreneurs in real estate development.  Roberto had built condominiums in the steel 
valley of Minas Gerais.   These projects consistently turned internal rates of return of about 30%, 
and did so with very little risk.  Roberto felt that Renata should sell the resort and re-invest the 
proceeds in a housing development, but he lacked the training to advise her properly, so when he 
saw the advertisement for the Nordeste Invest conference to take place in June 2007 in Salvador, 
Bahia, he suggested that they go and talk with experts.   
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 A few days before leaving for the conference, Renata received an unexpected, 
unsolicited offer for the property in the amount of 5 million Euro.  Her investment in the property 
was 5 million Reais.      
 
 
 
111 
7 Conference 
Salvador, Bahia.  June 2007.  Sitting at the back of the Nordeste Invest conference during 
a coffee break, she showed Roberto the offer she had received for Corumbau Lodge.  Roberto 
was impressed, but knowing how she felt about the Lodge, not surprised to learn she had turned it 
down point blank without discussion or counter-offer. 
Milling about during the coffee break were many of the players in Brazil’s rapidly 
growing second-home and resort market.  One of the many people they met was a Brazilian MBA 
student from U.C.L.A., who planned to research Brazil’s resort markets as part of a team thesis.  
Sergio, though limited in experience, had a keen mind, and asked thought-provoking questions. 
In response to Sergio’s questions and interest in the state of the project, Renata gave him 
her pre-development DCF Analysis (Exhibit 31) and her first year operating statement and DCF 
Analysis (Exhibit 32).  She also gave him charts showing her 2006 and year-to-date 2007 
occupancy rates (Exhibits 35 and 36), and a copy of her budgeted and actual construction 
expenses (Figure 6-1).  She also provided him with her most up-to-date Occupancy rate data for 
the competitive set (Exhibit 37).   
He agreed to review these items and make his own cash flow analysis and forecasts.  If 
the results turned out to be disappointing, he would also list the possible diagnoses, the 
corresponding remedies, and suggest tests to rule out options and isolate the correct diagnosis.   
Sergio’s initial interest was piqued through his curiosity about why the construction 
numbers had been significantly higher than estimated.  He observed that the June issue of the 
industry journal Construcao Mercado had a detailed budget for a project much like the Lodge.  
Using the country’s construction inflation index (INPC) he would be able to deflate the budget 
back to April 2004, and test the reasonableness of her numbers.  While this would have no effect 
on her predicament, it would be good to know for future construction work.   
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With respect to her offer, Sergio recommended appraisers and brokers who could provide 
her comparables. Like all developers, Sergio was interested in value creation, and wondered what 
the offer implied about the value Renata had created by her entrepreneurial work.  If the offer 
were accepted, he wondered, how much of the return would be attributable to movement of the 
foreign exchange market, and how much to other factors including Renata’s work.  Naturally, if 
the offer did not reflect the market value of the property, the exercise would be academic, but that 
did not dampen his curiosity. 
7.01 Macro- and International Economic Recap   
  At the afternoon conference session, Renata was pleased to learn that her 2003 
macroeconomic forecast for Brazil had been right on the money.  Accordingly, like Sergio, she 
suspected that a significant part of the value increase was attributable to international and macro-
economic forces.  In the four years since her investment group from Portugal decided to develop 
the property, Brazil’s incipient economic recovery marched forward.   
Its exchange rate had improved dramatically as Renata had predicted165.  On paper, her 
investors had profited from the currency changes alone. Interest rates had indeed fallen, and real 
estate values risen with lower investor return expectations166. The Trade Surplus had grown, 
keeping the economy moving forward (though at a very slow pace by the standards of other 
BRICS countries)167. Inflation remained under control, leading to expectations that interest rates 
may fall further168.  Such expectations gave new life to consumer finance markets, especially 
Brazil’s long dormant mortgage market.Foreign exchange reserves had increased, and economic 
and monetary experts were predicting ever higher credit ratings.169  
While this was welcome news, it had to be put into perspective.  Brazil still had major 
challenges ahead, and the pride and confidence that she heard in the financial news may have 
leapt ahead of the reality.  With real GDP growth of about 3%, and population growth of about 
2%, the country’s real GDP growth per capita was negligible170.  Growth per capita was the 
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critical test of economic development, and Brazil was barely passing.  While lower interest rates 
and more widely available financing could stimulate economic growth, the country had 
significant structural problems to deal with: It had the demographic profile of a young country, 
but the pension profile of a population of retirees171.  It had a burdensome level of taxation with 
few services to show for it.  It had invested so little in infrastructure that transport costs now 
consume “nearly 13% of Brazil’s GDP”.172   
She reminded herself that the markets were correcting an overreaction to Lula’s election, 
and that the hard work lay ahead.   According to a famous economist from MIT, there were eight 
tests, all of which a country had to pass to sustain GDP per capita growth.  These were: 1) A 
patient citizenry, necessary because it would take a hundred years to catch up to the global leader, 
even if you do everything right; 2) Low population growth, because population growth reduces 
the per capita GDP growth; 3)Education, because the world was being transformed by six critical 
technologies that effected a growing education premium; 4) Mobilization of scarce resources (for 
example the savings rate in China was 50%, and that in Singapore was 70%); 5) Investment in 
infra-structure; 6) A motivation system; 7) The ability to work together to acquire new skills; and 
8) Personal safety and no corruption173.  Brazil had a tremendously patient citizenry, as was 
shown by the popular understanding of the circumstances under which Lula had to work, but on 
every other measure, Brazil got low grades.  
7.02 The Real Estate Industry 2007  
According to the current conference speaker, the real estate industry seemed poised for 
significant growth.  Changes in the legal framework and falling interest rates made debt financing 
look as though it could emerge as a major driver of real estate activity.  Mortgage lending activity 
had grown from R$ 6.7 billion in 2003 (32.8% banks and 67.2% CEF174), to R$ 9.0 billion in 
2004 (33.3% banks, 66.6% CEF), to R$ 13.9 billion in 2005 (34.5% banks, 65.4% CEF).  
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Nevertheless, as the speaker had pointed out, the volume was a small share of GDP and had 
ample room for growth to continue175.   
The Brazilian stock exchange was now a major element in capitalizing real estate 
companies.  While the volume of all offerings had been growing quickly, real estate’s share of 
those offerings had grown even more quickly.  In 2005, real estate companies represented 7% of 
total equity offerings of $13.3 billion.  In 2006, they were 18% of total equity offerings of $30.1 
billion.  In the first quarter of 2007, real estate companies represented 48% of total equity 
offerings of $12.9 billion.  Notwithstanding all that activity, Brazilian real estate stocks 
comprised only approximately 3% of stock market activity by trading volume, and less than 3.5% 
by market cap.  By comparison, Mexican real estate companies comprised about 8.5% of that 
country’s stock market activity by trading volume, and less than 5% by market cap.  Thus, there 
was room for growth in equity offerings of real estate related companies.176   
Renata thought about what she just heard:  first, mortgage financing had doubled between 
2003 and 2005, and was expected to grow much faster as interest rates fell; second, equity 
financing had increased nearly six-fold from 2005 to 2006, and it appeared that 2007 would break 
the records.  The Brazilian real estate industry was awash in cash.  In addition, the outlook for 
every segments of the industry was positive.     
Retail: There were great opportunities to buy mall properties with income growing at 
faster than the rate of inflation, at 11 – 14% cap rates.  There were consolidation opportunities in 
the retail sector because many properties were owned by single mall owners. The five largest 
participants in the Mall market, Multiplan (5.6%), BR Malls  (5.0%), Sonae (4.9%), ANCAR 
(2.1%) and Iguatemi (4.3%), have only 21.8% of the market based on 100% of Gross Leasable 
Area (GLA) and only 11.9% of the market based on GLA weighted for ownership.  Thus, 80 – 
90% of the market is controlled by smaller owners177.  
Office: The office sector also presented opportunities because of constrained building 
activity over the previous several years.   There were differences, however, about the extent of the 
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office opportunity, as some believed that cap rates in this sector were already compressed, and 
that income would grow faster than inflation178. 
Residential: The enormous pent-up demand for residential real estate, 8 million homes 
according to the speaker, was growing179.  Brazilian demographics ensured significant demand 
for houses through 2020.  This did not quite make sense to Renata, but Roberto had promised to 
explain the housing market to her tonight over dinner.  
Lodging: The lodging and tourism real estate sectors were of greatest interest to her.  She 
wanted to know what had gone on over the past four years, what she could do to raise her 
occupancy rates, and where the lodging market was moving, and there was probably no better 
place to consider these matters than there at the Nordeste Investe conference surrounded by the 
lodging industry experts.   
7.03 Lodging and Tourism Real Estate Sector 
Brazil had made a strong economic recovery since 2003, but it was clear that tourism 
remained a small part of the economy.  The first speaker compared the tourism and lodging sector 
performance of 6 countries: the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Spain and the 
USA.    
The Brazilian government had increased its spending on tourism, but it had not made 
tourism as high a priority as had other countries.  Brazil’s spending on tourism in 2007 was 
expected to be 2.8% of GDP.  The equivalent figure in Mexico was 4.7%.  In the U.S. it was 
5.1%.  In Spain it was 6.5%, and in the Dominican Republic it is 21.1%.  Only in Argentina was 
the government spending on tourism, at 2.4%, slightly less (in percentage terms) than that of 
Brazil180.   
Brazil also had a small index of investment in tourism infrastructure.  In 2007, the 
percentage of total capital investments estimated to be invested in tourism infrastructure was 
7.7%.  In Mexico it was 13.4%.  In the U.S., 10.7%.  In Spain, 14.1%.  In Argentina, 8.8%.  In the 
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Dominican Republic, 20.7%, meaning that  Brazil had the lowest share of capital directed to the 
tourism sector.  Similarly, the impact of tourism on the GDP of Brazil (2.6%) was lower than that 
of Mexico (4.9%), Argentina (2.8%), Spain (6.8%), United States (3.8%) and Dominican 
Republic (6.3%)181.   
Except for Argentina, with 3.9 million foreign tourists estimated for 2007, Brazil, with 
5.36 million had the lowest of the group.  Mexico, for example, was expected to have 22 million 
tourists in 2007, over 4 times as many as Brazil.  Brazil had 7,132 hotels compared with Mexico’s 
13,751 hotels.  Further, Brazil, with a population per hotel ratio of 26,371, as compared with 
Mexico (7,814), Argentina (9,799), Spain (2,545),  Dominican Republic (13,466), and the United 
States (6,271), has more people per hotel than does any other country in the group.  In terms of 
economic activity generated by tourism, Brazil with $79 million compared unfavorably with 
Mexico which generated $149 million.  Further, Brazil’s .02 tourists per resident ratio, was one 
tenth Mexico’s .2 tourists per resident182. 
The speaker’s point was that tourism was in a very early stage of development in Brazil, 
and the growth potential in the sector and the associated real estate sector was significant.  Renata 
and others heard the speaker describe a child with the potential to grow, if only given food.  The 
questions from the audience demonstrated significant disagreement about how to feed the child.  
Many felt the problem was the size and efficiency of Brazil’s domestic air carriers, in their 
inability to keep pace with enough planes and planned flight routes183.  In a moment of levity one 
audience member claimed that the shortest route between the City of Cuiaba and the City of 
Natal, was through Lisbon.  From her own bookings, Renata knew that she had lost at least one 
customer coming from Sao Paulo because there were no seats available on flights to Porto 
Seguro.   
Another theory was that there were not enough international air routes directly to cities of 
the Northeast.   That, according to some was because there was no demand for seats.  Others 
opined that both the domestic and international supply of seats fell significantly when, in 2006, 
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Varig airlines, a domestic and international carrier with 40% of Brazil’s domestic market, was 
forced by financial problems to stop operating.  A third theory held that the airports of the 
Northeast were inadequate, and would not allow substantial growth in the number of flights from 
Europe directly to the Northeast184.  The fourth theory was the most interesting of all.  According 
to some, the supply of resort options had to reach a critical mass before the tour operators would 
invest in this market185.  The argument was, in effect, that supply caused demand.  Renata would 
remember to ask Sergio about that one.      
The speaker from the Ministry of Tourism made a very brief presentation.  According to 
Embratur estimates, international tourist flow was expected to grow from 5 million tourists in 
2006, to 9 million tourists in 2010186.  Renata quickly calculated that this was a CAGR of 15.8% 
over four years.  She wondered what the growth rate had been since 2003, and how a CAGR of 
15.8% would directly impact on her business.  The average spending per foreign tourist was also 
expected to grow as it had over several years, with average spending growth from 2005 to 2006 
of $100 per foreign visitor187.  According to the speaker, Embratur, since 2004 had formed tourist 
offices in eight countries, the U.K., Italy, Germany, Portugal, U.S., France, Spain and Japan.  The 
Ministry budget for 2006 was R$ 1 billion188.  The foreign offices were helping to increase 
foreign tourism demand despite limited flight availability, and limited tour operator interest 
because the size of the supply was so limited. 
As speakers from the lodging industry appeared in succession, one common trait 
emerged: resorts were increasingly conceived of as mixed use projects in which lodging was but 
one component.  Many resort proposals included a resort hotel, and a for-sale housing product of 
second homes or condominium apartments, or sometimes a combination.  Large developments 
could be more complicated mixed use developments189.  In later conversations, Sergio ventured 
that the gravitation toward a product mix was probably because the cash flow from the sale of 
housing would offset the hotel operating losses in the first few years, and the hotel services 
helped the sale of the houses.  Indeed, a broker she met from the state of Alagoas confirmed that 
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she could sell out large apartment condominium developments in resorts from the plans in thirty 
days190. 
The final speaker of the afternoon addressed the statistics and issues of her prime interest, 
i.e., the performance of resorts in the luxury sector.   
The speaker’s presentation told her that supply in the Competitive Set had grown 46% in 
the period since 2003191.  That represented a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 9.85%.  
This was somewhat faster than she had anticipated back in 2003.   
In the same period, Demand in the Competitive Set had at a CAGR of 11%, also faster 
than she had foreseen192.  Therefore, Occupancy Rates in the competitive set had risen from 
around 50% to around 60% by 2006, with a slight decline from 2005 to 2006 related to, some 
believed, a large number of resort openings193.   
Similarly, ADR for the competitive set had experienced a CAGR of 14.35%, and 
RevPAR had risen at a compound rate of 19.1%194.  Clearly she was having a different experience 
from that of the other top flight lodging options in the area, the selective results of which were 
presented next. 
 Iberostar, Praia do Forte, BA 
 
Iberostar had opened a large resort in Bahia on the Coconut Coast, and had quickly 
achieved occupancies above 65%195.  Iberostar was a vertically integrated company with its own 
tour operators on whom it relied heavily.  The company also owned its own planes, which 
allowed it to create demand through charter flights196.  The charter flights offered the flexibility to 
connect from Europe directly to Salvador, the capital of Bahia.  From there, the resort was only 
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an hour’s drive.  Finally, Iberostar had also located itself in a recognized resort destination: Praia 
do Forte.   
                                                                                     Iberostar, Praia do Forte, BA 
                                                                                   
Renata recognized the advantages of a mass tourism product that strongly appealed to 
tour operators.  The charter flights were a big advantage.  Most commercial international flights 
still went through Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro.  Thus, for example, to reach her Lodge, foreign 
clients would have to fly to Sao Paulo, then to Porto Seguro, then by private plane to Corumbau.  
A direct flight to Bahia would save two legs of the trip, and was itself a significantly shorter flight 
than was the Europe to Sao Paulo trip.  Further, having a well-known tourist destination, a huge 
marketing budget, and a name-brand company were major draws.  But she had never intended to 
enter the mass tourism business.  Wasn’t there a role for a small resort of the kind she had 
created? 
Txai Resorts, Itacare, BA  
 
He turned to another success story.  Txai Resorts in Itacare, Bahia, had entered the 
market shortly before her.  It began with sixteen bungalows, each about 80 – 90 square meters197.  
Yet, despite its unsuitable size for tour operators, its lack of access to charter flights, its non-
brand name operator, the absence of amenities such as a golf course, it had become the most chic 
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resort in Brazil, commanding daily rates of R$ 1200, and at reasonably high occupancy levels198.  
In fact, Txai had become the principal example of an exceptional boutique resort in Brazil, and as 
such, was acquiring a brand name status.  The owners intended to capitalize on the success.  Not 
only had they increased the number of units to 40, but on their 100 hectare site, they added a 
luxury resort home component199.  It too was a success, and each component seemed to help the 
other.  The developers were already planning to raise funds in the public equity markets through 
an IPO later in the summer.  Doing so would provide the funds necessary to build Txai resorts 
throughout the country.  She was eager to hear how this would be received in the Brazilian IPO 
market.   
                                                                                Txai Resorts, Itacare, BA 
                                                                                
One reason for Txai’s success was location.  The developers had got to the Itacare area 
early in its growth.  One of the most beautiful areas of the coast of Bahia, Itacare remained mostly 
unknown because it was inaccessible.  After the road from Ilheus to Itacare was paved, Brazil, 
and then Europe, discovered Itacare.  It became a tourist destination.  Txai’s fortunes developed 
with the destination.   
Txai had also managed to penetrate the very thin market of extremely rich Paulistas.  The 
resort became the prestige destination for that set, but how they did this was unclear.  Media 
exposure helped of course, but she had also heard that the developers themselves were very well 
connected within Sao Paulo, which enabled them to penetrate this market.  This meant that they 
were able to maintain occupancy rates without reliance on the tour operators that controlled 
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bookings of foreign tourists.  They had managed to gain access to a domestic market that could 
afford the resort. 
Renata asked the speaker, a well-known hotel consultant in Brazil, if she could speak 
with him privately for a few minutes.  They went for coffee, while she told her story.  He 
explained that the examples he gave contained important implications for Renata.  He summed up 
the implications as follows: 
Rule #1:  The resort does not make the destination.  The destination makes the resort.   
Rule #2:  Accessibility is critical, and that meant a successful resort could be located no 
more than a 60 minute car ride from a major airport. 
Rule # 3:  A competitive advantage was critical. 
 Iberostar had located in Priai do Forte, after it was already a destination.  Txai located in 
Itacare, having guessed correctly about its becoming a destination.  Iberostar was an hour’s drive 
from Salvador airport.  Txai was an hour’s drive from the airport in Ilheus.   Iberostar’s 
competitive advantage was its vertical integration.  Txai had its deep Paulista connections.  
Renata, on the other hand, had not built in a destination, had not built in an accessible location, 
and had not defined her competitive advantage for marketing purposes.  According to him, it was 
that simple. 
Everything he said made sense, but she was troubled by the determinism in his analysis.  
The consultant spoke as if these were laws that extracted a price for their violation.  So, she 
herself brought up a third example.                         
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The Praia do Forte Eco-resort had set the standard for resort development and eco-
tourism in Brazil.  It opened in the early 1990’s before much serious thought had been given to 
tourism on the Northeast Coast of the country.  Klaus Peters, an industrialist from Sao Paulo, sold 
his company and pursued his dream of combining environmentalism and tourism in the remote 
location of Praia do Forte.  Today the location is an hour’s drive from Salvador airport.  But at the 
time, getting from Salvador to Praia do Forte was a trial.  He built in a location that was not a 
destination.  He built in a location that was inaccessible.  After the location became accessible, he 
did not build a conference center, or seek to penetrate a business market, which he thought would 
detract from the atmosphere200.   
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He broke all the rules to pursue his dream.  In addition to buying 292 hectares of lush 
beachfront land, and building 200 rooms at the outset, he revitalized the town of Praia do Forte 
for its inhabitants and for the tourists to his resort.  He fought to preserve Atlantic rainforest and 
to preserve the turtle population.  He sponsored a rediscovery of Bahian culture that resulted in 
music and dance troupes that provided the entertainment at his resort.  He provided jobs, offered 
his guests an unprecedented eco-resort experience, and established the best cuisine in Bahia.  The 
result was a spectacular success.  The resort is still considered among the best in Brazil.  It has 
maintained occupancy in the 61 – 73% range, which fell to 58% in 2006 because of expansion 
and transition activities201. 
The hotel consultant agreed with her.  But, he pointed out, it was a struggle at first.  
Renata may also succeed through perseverance and adherence to her dream, but it wouldn’t be 
easy and would clearly take time.  Further, he suggested, a nine room resort would never make 
Corumbau into a destination.  Praia do Forte succeeded in part because it was bigger. 
There was another issue as well: demand segmentation.  Within the competitive set, he 
informed her, 55% of the demand was booked through tour operators, and 25% came from 
groups202.  Only 20% of the demand arose from Individual travelers, and this demand, it 
appeared, was mainly domestic, which was a very price sensitive market.  This meant that Renata 
started out by forfeiting 55% of the market because she was just too small and out of the way for 
tour operators to bother with.  Then she lost another 25% of the market because she was not large 
enough to accommodate large groups.  Then she had to compete for the remaining price-sensitive 
20%, a domestic market that mostly would not pay her rates, or the extra travel cost.  All together, 
the math did not leave much for her.  According to this expert, she had done everything wrong, 
and there was no way out.  Renata was frustrated by this judgment.  She had taken a keen 
personal vision and brought it to life.  The Lodge at Corumbau offered an authentic experience of 
nature and people, and did so with great comfort and taste.  Were there no independent travelers 
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who could articulate their interest in an adventure rather than go to a generic enclave resort for a 
week just because it was easy?  
After the presentations were over, she was glad to see Roberto’s smile.  She was eager to 
change the subject.  Roberto had promised to explain his investments in Ipatinga, MG, and to 
brief her on the housing sector of real estate over a Japanese dinner at a very chic Salvadoran 
restaurant overlooking the harbor.  She was all ears.             
8 Brazil Housing Market 2007 
 Roberto pointed out that there were many different residential property markets 
throughout the country with different characteristics.  In some, there were specific drivers that 
brought about appreciation at a rate faster than the rate of inflation.  However, that was not the 
generally the case.  Markets in Brazil were not supply constrained in the way of markets on the 
U.S. coasts.  There was plenty of land, and in general, regulatory authorities and community 
groups did not obstruct the process through abusive anti-growth land use regulation.   
The prevailing motivation among housing real estate investors was to realize profits 
through building and selling homes in a high demand market, rather than to hold for future 
appreciation203.  Brazil had a large housing deficit.  It also had a large population of people 
between the ages of 25 and 50, considered to be the prime age group for buying homes.  Renata 
remembered the 7.9 million home deficit that the speaker earlier today had mentioned.  That, 
however, was not exactly the deficit Roberto was talking about. 
The 7.9 million home deficit had been calculated in a careful study by the Brazilian 
government and a not-for profit foundation, and Roberto was not questioning the result of the 
study204.  Clearly, there were many households living in substandard housing, and many families 
who were trying to establish independent households, but were currently living within other 
households, such as married couples living with parents.  This deficit was a very important 
number to know in quantifying the depth of a social issue.  But it was not a commercial measure 
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of pent-up demand for homes, which is how the number was frequently misrepresented.  The 
reason that the deficit did not equal the demand was that 88% of the households composing that 
deficit could not afford a home.  More specifically, 88% of the households needing homes earned 
less than 5 times the minimum wage, which made them income ineligible to buy new homes.     
Renata was skeptical that so many experts could be misrepresenting the size of the 
housing demand.  Roberto explained the math.  Households with income of less than 5 times the 
minimum wage earn less than R$1750 per month (MW = R$350).  He asked whether a household 
income of that size could buy a home based on the mortgage that it could afford.  A mortgage 
issued by Caixa Economica Federal (CEF) with a subsidized rate of interest at 11.5% (rather than 
a market rate of 14%) and a 20-year term, were terms that in theory could be available to 
qualified households.  If the household were to devote 40% of household income, or R$ 700 per 
month, it could service a mortgage of R$65,640.  Assuming for the sake of argument that the 
household has no significant savings, then the home price they can afford would be equivalent to 
the mortgage amount.  The lowest commercially reasonable price at which a housing developer 
could sell a home and maintain a margin is in the R$ 2000 per square meter range.  According to 
housing developer Gafisa, it can sell units for R$1800 – 2000 per square meter205.  Using a 
maximum purchase price of R$65,000, and a minimum sale price of R$ 1800 per square meter, 
the household could afford to buy a maximum of 36 square meters.  The rooms in Renata’s resort 
were 130 square meters, so she could see the problem.  
Recognizing these constraints, homebuilders such as Rodobens had introduced affordable 
housing units from 45 square meters to 90 square meters206.  However, they also recognized that 
units of this size are still not within the means of a household earning less than 5 times the 
minimum wage.  That is why Rodobens, in explaining its affordable “New Segment” product, 
uses R$ 1750 per month (5 times the minimum wage) as the minimum income of their target 
buyer. Since 88% of the households needing homes earn below the minimum target, 88% of the 
households cannot afford to buy the most affordable and smallest available product, and 
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therefore, 88% of the 7.9 million unit deficit cannot be a reasonable estimate of commercial 
demand for housing.   
To explain the actual pent-up demand for housing, Roberto drew a figure showing 
Brazil’s 52 million households by household income (monthly) expressed in $R and in multiples 
of minimum wage.  The figure was a pyramid to graphically convey the small number of 
households with income at the higher end of the range, and the large number at the bottom (see 
Figure 8-1).  Approximately 8% of the 7.9 million home deficit, or 630,000 homes was 
experienced by those households earning between five and ten times the minimum wage.  
Another 4% of the deficit, or 316,000 homes corresponded to households with ten to twenty 
minimum wage incomes.  
 
  Figure 8-1: Brazil’s Housing Demand207 
 
 
These two groups together represented a present demand of 12% of 7.9 million or a total 
of 948,000 units. In addition, the pent-up demand was growing by annual new unmet demand.   
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The number of households grew by about 3.6% per year between 1991 and 2000, faster 
than the population growth rate of 1.6% per year during the same period208.  When multiplied by 
Brazils 51.6 million households, this growth rate meant an increase of over 1,800,000 households 
per year.  Assuming that 23.5% of these new households, as indicated by the pyramid (assuming 
that households grow with equal velocity at all income brackets)  can afford and want homes, the 
annual additional demand would be 400,000 units.  If there were no new construction at all, this 
400,000 increase in households demanding houses (or really pent-up households as you 
technically cannot be a household without a house) would be identical to the number of units 
added annually to the housing demand.    Fundacao Jao Pinheiro estimates that the actual increase 
in demand is 1,200,000, which may be correct because the rate of household formation would 
perhaps be larger if there were more homes constructed209.     
It is estimated that the house supply is 300,000 per year210.  Therefore, if Fundacap Jao 
Pinheiro is right, the annual addition to pent-up demand would be 900,000 housing units per year, 
and if Roberto were right, the annual addition to demand would be 100,000 dwelling units.  
Whatever the correct number, it would add to the 948,000 units of pent-up demand.  Thus, the 
pent-up demand among households who could pay for houses is growing each year. 
 It is important to remember that the 5 to 20 times minimum wage households is 
comprised of two segments.  The question of whether the segment earning more than 5 times, but 
less than ten times the minimum wage has the ability to buy homes is complex.  Clearly at the top 
of the range, the wherewithal is present.  As one penetrates lower in the pyramid, the challenges 
to homeownership become greater.   
That is where the second important driver (the first being the pent-up demand and the 
annual increases to that demand) of Brazil’s residential real estate sector: changes to the mortgage 
industry.  Real estate financing in Brazil is quickly emerging from the dark ages, prompted 
largely by changes to the law governing foreclosure, which has reduced the collection time-
frame211.  The result has been a rapidly evolving industry that is modernizing its underwriting 
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practices and loan terms.  In other words, there is a tendency toward longer amortization periods, 
more flexible credit qualification, and so forth.   These changes are taking place within the macro-
economic context of falling interest rates.  The combination means that financing will be an 
increasingly important driver of the industry212.   
Mexico’s mortgage industry is in a similar situation, though a bit ahead of Brazil’s.  In 
2006, Brazil’s mortgages were 1.7% of GDP, about the level of Mexico in 2004.  Mexico in 2006 
had mortgages of approximately 2% of GDP.  All of this is in sharp contrast to the more 
developed nations.  As of 2004, the United Kingdom had mortgage debt of 65% of GDP, the 
United States of 61% of GDP; Europe of, on average, 43% of GDP; France of 29% of GDP, and 
Chile of 16% of GDP.  There was great room for expansion of mortgage lending in Brazil213. 
Going back to the segment that earns between five and ten times the MW, as interest 
rates come down in Brazil, as amortization terms become longer, and as underwriting becomes 
more flexible, that segment may be more thoroughly served.  The two tables below show how 
lengthening current amortization periods to medium terms of 276 months, and cutting current 
interest rates by 20 basis points, captures more homebuyers in major cities.                         
129 
Figure 8-2: Affordability Sensitivity214 
 
Figure 8-3: Affordability Sensitivity – Potential Buyers 
       
In addition to the presence of a large and growing pent-up demand, and a mortgage 
industry that is evolving to convert more of the deficit into demand, demographics are also 
driving the home building industry.  A large and growing component of the large and growing 
Brazilian population, is people in the home-buying ages between 20 and 50.  The more rapid 
growth of this population segment, than of the population as a whole (which has grown at about 
1.7% per year) is expected to continue until 2020215.  In other words, the new demand indicated 
above is likely to be underestimated, and to grow more rapidly over time. 
The presence of these drivers, and the fact that the home building industry was not 
keeping up with the demand for houses was not lost on the real estate industry, or on the 
securities industry.  In the last few years, several of Sao Paulo’s local homebuilders have 
transformed themselves into larger national companies through foreign or domestic equity 
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investments.  Invested monies have been used in part to upgrade company operations to the best 
international standards, develop strategies and product models, and expand their reach into major 
markets throughout the country216.  Since late 2005, the homebuilders have raised substantial 
capital in primary or secondary offerings in the Brazilian securities markets.  The following are 
some of the offerings of note. 
Figure 8-4: Offerings of Note by Homebuilders on the Brazilian Securities Market217 
Company Year Price 
Cyrella 2005 $393 million 
Rossi 2006 $468 million 
Gafisa 2006 $438 million 
Company SA 2006 $132 million 
Cyrella 2006 $333 million 
Abyara 2006 $75 million 
Klabin Segal 2006 $244 million 
Rodobens 2007 $183 million 
Tecnisa 2007 $370 million 
Gafisa 2007 $560 million 
PDG 2007 $296 million 
Even 2007 $190 million 
CCDI 2007 $244 million 
 Total $3,926 million 
                   
The above offerings which sum to almost 4 billion dollars is an indication of how well 
capitalized the home building industry has become in a short time.  These companies are now 
competing with one another for market share.  As of May 2007, the allocation of market share 
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was as follows:  Cyrella 14%; Tecnisa 9.7%; CCDI 9.2%; Even 8.6%; Company S.A. 8.3%; 
Gafisa 6.2%; Rossi 5.3%; Klabin-Segall 4.7%; PDG 3.7%.   The three largest companies had 
32.8% of the market.  The six largest companies had 55.8% of the market.  The nine largest 
companies had 69.5% of the market218. 
9 The Steel Valley 
Renata was impressed by her friend’s industry knowledge, and wanted him to talk a little 
about his own work.  Back in 2003, Roberto had sent her a cash flow projection for an investment 
he planned to make in a twelve apartment development in the Steel Valley of Minas Gerais.  The 
City was called Ipatinga, and its major employer was Usiminas, a large steel manufacturer.  
Subsequently, he and eleven others made the investment together.  Since the number of investors 
corresponded to the number of apartments, at the end of the construction, each partner would 
receive title to one of the condominium units.  Some partner intended to sell at an anticipated 
profit, while others wanted to hold the unit for investment or as home buyers who intended to live 
in the unit upon its completion. 
As predicted, the development took 36 months to build.  It was financed entirely by installment 
payments from the twelve buyers.  The construction cost was significantly more than anticipated 
initially, and the buyers were obligated for the actual construction cost, but the value of the 
completed units was also significantly more than expected providing a better than projected 
result.  The ex post IRR was 39%, much greater than the 28% IRR ex ante.   Roberto reviewed 
the summary cash flow per investor with her. 
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Figure 9-1: Summary of Housing Investment, Ipatinga, MG 
 
Summary of Housing Investment, Ipatinga, MG   
12 investment units           
     2003 2004 2005 2006
Cash Flows Per Investor          
Acquisition    -7,000 0 0 0
Documentation  -4,000 0 0 0
Construction    0 -16,800 -16,800 -16,800
Finnish Work     0 0 0 -18,000
Total Outflow  -11,000 -16800 -16800 -34800
Sales Proceeds        120,000
Net Cash Flow  -11,000 -16,800 -16,800 85,200
             
IRR 39%          
       
He did not have an After-tax summary for the investment as a whole, which Renata 
wanted to see, but promised to prepare one.   
Roberto was very enthusiastic about a new 18 unit apartment building that he planned to 
start within ninety days.  This was a development he intended to take on himself (unless he could 
convince Renata to join in.)  Usiminas had recently announced its plans for a US$2.6 billion 
expansion of its plant in Ipatinga.  The additional work load in connection with the expansion was 
expected to bring 10,000 new employees into Ipatinga on a temporary basis, however, ultimately 
the expansion would result in 2000 additional permanent jobs219. 
Roberto had noticed that neither the City nor the Company had signaled how they 
planned to house all these people.  Upon investigation, he found that Ipatinga planned to 
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construct 300 homes for their employees.  Two thousand new jobs against 300 new homes was 
exactly the type of market imbalance that made a developer like Roberto pay close attention.  
Renata came to realize that he wanted to build a lot more than eighteen units, and found that she 
too was beginning to pay close attention. 
She asked him whether any of the cash-rich homebuilders he had described earlier had 
shown up in Ipatinga.  To his knowledge, they had not, and he believed that a city the size of 
Ipatinga would not interest them.  The absence of large competitors in Ipatinga and other similar 
locations allowed small developers strategic points of entry.  He pointed out that the large 
homebuilders were primarily interested in Brazil’s ten largest cities: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, 
Brasilia, etc, as was appropriate to the size of their platforms220.    
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10 Beginnings  
The first day of the conference had been productive, and thought provoking.   She came 
to get some ideas and help on rescuing the financial performance of her resort project and was 
now eagerly anticipating Sergio’s Occupancy and ADR forecast and DCF Analysis.  She clearly 
needed to understand her options to improve her cash flow.  The expert hotel consultant, while 
unhelpful in suggesting solutions, had set forth the obstacles.  According to him, between the tour 
operators, the group tourists, the small high-end domestic market and the unknown and 
inaccessible location, she was trapped, and that as a competitive advantage, right now it seemed 
that her vision, intelligence, taste and hard work were the enemies of market success.  But she 
also had some new questions to think about.  Roberto’s invitation was pretty tempting, but she 
could not go back to her investors right now for additional capital without solving the problems of 
the Lodge.  It seemed that the only short term solution was to sell it.  She was pleased that she 
had gotten the macroeconomics right because if that analysis had failed, they would have no way 
out. But she kept wondering what she had done wrong in the initial feasibility analysis.  Perhaps 
Sergio would be able to show her, and even better, help her reverse the trend. 
Ultimately she realized that she had to make some major decisions pretty quickly: sell the 
Lodge and recoup her investment position in order to invest in housing development.  Or use 
some better analysis and a creative turnaround to move Lodge operations toward a future pay out.  
There was even a third hybrid alternative she had been thinking about, but needed more 
information.  She was optimistic that with Sergio’s incisive and analytic mind, and Roberto’s 
knowledge and perception of markets to augment her own creativity and problem-solving skills, 
she would quickly identify and implement the proper strategy.        
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Exhibit 1: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels October 2001 
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Exhibit 3: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels December 2001
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Exhibit 4: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels January 2002
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Exhibit 5: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels February 2002
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Exhibit 6: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels March 2002
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Exhibit 7: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels April 2002
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Exhibit 8: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels May 2002
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Exhibit 10: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels July 2002
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Exhibit 11: Occupancy Table for Local Hotels August 2002
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Exhibit 13: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas October 2001 
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Exhibit 14: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas November 2001
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Exhibit 15: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas December 2001
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Exhibit 16: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas January 2002
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Exhibit 17: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas February 2002
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Exhibit 18: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas March 2002
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Exhibit 19: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas April 2002
166
Exhibit 20: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas May 2002
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Exhibit 21: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas June 2002
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Exhibit 22: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas July 2002
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Exhibit 23: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas August 2002
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Exhibit 24: Occupancy Table for Bahia Pousadas September 2002
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Exhibit 25: Bungalow Plan
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Exhibit 26: Salon Plan
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Exhibit 27: Reception Plan
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Exhibit 28: Employee Housing Plan
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Exhibit 29: Luxury Resort Market: Occupancy Rate /ADR
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Exhibit 30: Partial Site Plan
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Exhibit 31: Pre-Construction Cash Flow Projection 
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Exhibit 32: Pre-Construction Cash Flow Projection Inputs
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Exhibit 33: Post-Construction Cash Flow Projection w/ Year 1 Actual
P
O
U
S
A
D
A
 B
U
N
G
A
LO
W
 - 
Fl
ux
o 
de
 C
ai
xa
V
al
or
es
 e
m
 R
$
Im
pl
an
-
ta
çã
o
P
er
ío
do
 d
e 
O
pe
ra
çã
o
D
is
cr
im
in
aç
ão
A
no
 0
0
A
no
 0
1
A
no
 0
2
A
no
 0
3
A
no
 0
4
A
no
 0
5
A
no
 0
6
A
no
 0
7
A
no
 0
8
A
no
 0
9
A
no
 1
0
IN
V
E
S
TI
M
E
N
TO
C
us
to
 d
o 
Te
rr
en
o
0
C
us
to
 d
as
 In
st
al
aç
õe
s
(5
,0
00
,0
00
)
O
P
E
R
A
Ç
Ã
O
R
ec
ei
ta
 O
pe
ra
ci
on
al
 B
ru
ta
27
4,
73
0
   
   
 
68
6,
82
6
   
   
 
1,
37
3,
65
2
   
 
2,
28
9,
42
0
   
 
2,
28
9,
42
0
   
 
2,
28
9,
42
0
   
 
2,
28
9,
42
0
   
 
2,
28
9,
42
0
   
 
2,
28
9,
42
0
   
 
2,
28
9,
42
0
   
 
 - 
H
os
pe
da
ge
m
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
59
7,
24
0
   
   
 
1,
19
4,
48
0
   
 
1,
99
0,
80
0
   
 
1,
99
0,
80
0
   
 
1,
99
0,
80
0
   
 
1,
99
0,
80
0
   
 
1,
99
0,
80
0
   
 
1,
99
0,
80
0
   
 
1,
99
0,
80
0
   
 
 - 
B
eb
id
as
28
,6
68
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
14
3,
33
8
   
   
 
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
23
8,
89
6
   
   
 
 - 
O
ut
ro
s 
(te
le
fo
ni
a,
 la
va
nd
er
ia
, e
tc
)
7,
16
7
   
   
   
  
17
,9
17
   
   
   
35
,8
34
   
   
   
59
,7
24
   
   
   
59
,7
24
   
   
   
59
,7
24
   
   
   
59
,7
24
   
   
   
59
,7
24
   
   
   
59
,7
24
   
   
   
59
,7
24
   
   
   
Tr
ib
ut
os
24
,1
52
   
   
   
72
,3
67
   
   
   
97
,0
81
   
   
   
16
1,
80
2
   
   
 
16
1,
80
2
   
   
 
16
1,
80
2
   
   
 
16
1,
80
2
   
   
 
16
1,
80
2
   
   
 
16
1,
80
2
   
   
 
16
1,
80
2
   
   
 
 - 
S
im
pl
es
 F
ed
er
al
23
,9
02
   
   
   
72
,1
17
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
 - 
C
of
in
s
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
41
,2
10
   
   
   
68
,6
83
   
   
   
68
,6
83
   
   
   
68
,6
83
   
   
   
68
,6
83
   
   
   
68
,6
83
   
   
   
68
,6
83
   
   
   
68
,6
83
   
   
   
 - 
P
IS
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
8,
92
9
   
   
   
  
14
,8
81
   
   
   
14
,8
81
   
   
   
14
,8
81
   
   
   
14
,8
81
   
   
   
14
,8
81
   
   
   
14
,8
81
   
   
   
14
,8
81
   
   
   
 - 
IS
S
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
36
,9
09
   
   
   
61
,5
16
   
   
   
61
,5
16
   
   
   
61
,5
16
   
   
   
61
,5
16
   
   
   
61
,5
16
   
   
   
61
,5
16
   
   
   
61
,5
16
   
   
   
 - 
IC
M
S
25
0
   
   
   
   
  
25
0
   
   
   
   
  
10
,0
34
   
   
   
16
,7
23
   
   
   
16
,7
23
   
   
   
16
,7
23
   
   
   
16
,7
23
   
   
   
16
,7
23
   
   
   
16
,7
23
   
   
   
16
,7
23
   
   
   
R
ec
ei
ta
 O
pe
ra
ci
on
al
 L
íq
ui
da
25
0,
57
9
   
   
 
61
4,
45
9
   
   
 
1,
27
6,
57
1
   
 
2,
12
7,
61
8
   
 
2,
12
7,
61
8
   
 
2,
12
7,
61
8
   
 
2,
12
7,
61
8
   
 
2,
12
7,
61
8
   
 
2,
12
7,
61
8
   
 
2,
12
7,
61
8
   
 
C
us
to
 d
os
 S
er
vi
ço
s 
/ P
ro
du
to
s
19
5,
50
4
   
   
 
26
9,
23
8
   
   
 
39
1,
21
1
   
   
 
54
6,
49
4
   
   
 
54
6,
49
4
   
   
 
54
6,
49
4
   
   
 
54
6,
49
4
   
   
 
54
6,
49
4
   
   
 
54
6,
49
4
   
   
 
54
6,
49
4
   
   
 
 - 
P
es
so
al
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
14
1,
00
7
   
   
 
 - 
E
nc
ar
go
s 
Tr
ab
al
hi
st
as
1,
91
2
   
   
   
  
5,
76
9
   
   
   
  
11
,2
81
   
   
   
11
,2
81
   
   
   
11
,2
81
   
   
   
11
,2
81
   
   
   
11
,2
81
   
   
   
11
,2
81
   
   
   
11
,2
81
   
   
   
11
,2
81
   
   
   
 - 
C
on
ta
do
r
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
6,
00
0
   
   
   
  
 - 
A
lim
en
ta
çã
o
35
,8
34
   
   
   
89
,5
86
   
   
   
17
9,
17
2
   
   
 
29
8,
62
0
   
   
 
29
8,
62
0
   
   
 
29
8,
62
0
   
   
 
29
8,
62
0
   
   
 
29
8,
62
0
   
   
 
29
8,
62
0
   
   
 
29
8,
62
0
   
   
 
 - 
B
eb
id
as
8,
60
0
   
   
   
  
21
,5
01
   
   
   
43
,0
01
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
71
,6
69
   
   
   
 - 
O
ut
ro
s 
(te
le
fo
ni
a,
 la
va
nd
er
ia
, e
tc
)
2,
15
0
   
   
   
  
5,
37
5
   
   
   
  
10
,7
50
   
   
   
17
,9
17
   
   
   
17
,9
17
   
   
   
17
,9
17
   
   
   
17
,9
17
   
   
   
17
,9
17
   
   
   
17
,9
17
   
   
   
17
,9
17
   
   
   
D
es
pe
sa
s 
G
er
ai
s
71
,4
30
   
   
   
17
8,
57
5
   
   
 
35
7,
15
0
   
   
 
59
5,
24
9
   
   
 
59
5,
24
9
   
   
 
59
5,
24
9
   
   
 
59
5,
24
9
   
   
 
59
5,
24
9
   
   
 
59
5,
24
9
   
   
 
59
5,
24
9
   
   
 
 - 
V
en
da
s/
R
es
er
va
s/
M
ar
ke
tin
g
5,
49
5
   
   
   
  
13
,7
37
   
   
   
27
,4
73
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
 - 
Á
gu
a/
Lu
z/
Te
le
fo
ne
/In
er
ne
t
54
,9
46
   
   
   
13
7,
36
5
   
   
 
27
4,
73
0
   
   
 
45
7,
88
4
   
   
 
45
7,
88
4
   
   
 
45
7,
88
4
   
   
 
45
7,
88
4
   
   
 
45
7,
88
4
   
   
 
45
7,
88
4
   
   
 
45
7,
88
4
   
   
 
 - 
M
an
ut
en
çã
o
5,
49
5
   
   
   
  
13
,7
37
   
   
   
27
,4
73
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
 - 
D
iv
er
so
s
5,
49
5
   
   
   
  
13
,7
37
   
   
   
27
,4
73
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
45
,7
88
   
   
   
D
es
pe
sa
 O
pe
ra
ci
on
al
26
6,
93
4
   
   
 
44
7,
81
3
   
   
 
74
8,
36
1
   
   
 
1,
14
1,
74
3
   
 
1,
14
1,
74
3
   
 
1,
14
1,
74
3
   
 
1,
14
1,
74
3
   
 
1,
14
1,
74
3
   
 
1,
14
1,
74
3
   
 
1,
14
1,
74
3
   
 
FL
U
X
O
 D
E
 C
A
IX
A
R
es
ul
ta
do
 O
pe
ra
ci
on
al
 L
íq
ui
do
(1
6,
35
5)
   
   
  
16
6,
64
6
   
   
 
52
8,
21
0
   
   
 
98
5,
87
5
   
   
 
98
5,
87
5
   
   
 
98
5,
87
5
   
   
 
98
5,
87
5
   
   
 
98
5,
87
5
   
   
 
98
5,
87
5
   
   
 
98
5,
87
5
   
   
 
 - 
D
ep
re
ci
aç
ão
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
50
0,
00
0
   
   
 
 - 
R
es
ul
ta
do
 A
nt
es
 IR
P
J 
/ C
S
L
(5
16
,3
55
)
   
   
(3
33
,3
54
)
   
   
28
,2
10
   
   
   
48
5,
87
5
   
   
 
48
5,
87
5
   
   
 
48
5,
87
5
   
   
 
48
5,
87
5
   
   
 
48
5,
87
5
   
   
 
48
5,
87
5
   
   
 
48
5,
87
5
   
   
 
IR
P
J 
/ C
S
L
-
   
   
   
   
   
-
   
   
   
   
   
6,
77
0
   
   
   
  
14
1,
19
7
   
   
 
14
1,
19
7
   
   
 
14
1,
19
7
   
   
 
14
1,
19
7
   
   
 
14
1,
19
7
   
   
 
14
1,
19
7
   
   
 
14
1,
19
7
   
   
 
R
es
ul
ta
do
 L
íq
ui
do
(1
6,
35
5)
   
   
  
16
6,
64
6
   
   
 
52
1,
43
9
   
   
 
84
4,
67
7
   
   
 
84
4,
67
7
   
   
 
84
4,
67
7
   
   
 
84
4,
67
7
   
   
 
84
4,
67
7
   
   
 
84
4,
67
7
   
   
 
84
4,
67
7
   
   
 
S
al
do
 n
o 
A
no
(5
,0
00
,0
00
)
(1
6,
35
5)
16
6,
64
6
52
1,
43
9
84
4,
67
7
84
4,
67
7
84
4,
67
7
84
4,
67
7
84
4,
67
7
84
4,
67
7
84
4,
67
7
4,
77
2,
61
5
S
al
do
 A
cu
m
ul
ad
o
(5
,0
00
,0
00
)
(5
,0
16
,3
55
)
(4
,8
49
,7
09
)
(4
,3
28
,2
70
)
(3
,4
83
,5
92
)
(2
,6
38
,9
15
)
(1
,7
94
,2
38
)
(9
49
,5
60
)
(1
04
,8
83
)
73
9,
79
5
1,
58
4,
47
2
6,
35
7,
08
7
R
E
S
U
LT
A
D
O
 D
O
 IN
V
E
S
TI
M
E
N
TO TI
R
0.
9%
 a
.m
.
10
.8
%
 a
.a
.
V
P
L 
(1
2%
 a
.a
.)
P
A
Y
B
A
C
K
97
 m
es
es
8.
1 
an
os
V
al
or
R
es
id
ua
l
(1
2%
 a
.a
.)
(R
$3
52
,4
53
.0
5)
O
bs
.: 
S
om
en
te
 p
od
em
 o
pt
ar
 p
el
o 
S
im
pl
es
 F
ed
er
al
, c
om
o 
em
pr
es
a 
de
 p
eq
ue
no
 p
or
te
 (E
P
P
), 
as
 p
es
so
as
 ju
ríd
ic
as
 c
om
 re
ce
ita
 b
ru
ta
 a
nu
al
 n
ão
 s
up
er
io
r a
 
R
$ 
1.
20
0.
00
0,
00
. P
or
ta
nt
o,
 o
s 
cá
lc
ul
os
 s
ão
 fe
ito
s 
pe
la
s 
re
gr
as
 d
o 
S
im
pl
es
 F
ed
er
al
 a
pe
na
s 
no
s 
an
os
 e
m
 q
ue
 a
 r
ec
ei
ta
 é
 in
fe
ri
or
 a
 e
st
e 
va
lo
r.
N
ão
 p
od
e 
op
ta
r p
el
o 
S
im
pl
es
 a
 p
es
so
a 
ju
ríd
ic
a 
qu
e 
te
nh
a 
só
ci
o 
es
tra
ng
ei
ro
 re
si
de
nt
e 
no
 e
xt
er
io
r.
180
Exhibit 34: Post-Construction Cash Flow Projection Inputs
POUSADA BUNGALOW - Premissas Valores em R$
Nº Bangalôs 9
Custo do Terreno           R$
Custo das Instalações   R$ 5,000,000         
Preço das Diárias
Alta Estação 2,000.00R$      7 dias
Baixa Estação 1,200.00R$      357 dias
Taxa de Ocupação 1º ano 2º ano 3º ano 4º ano em diante
6% 15% 30% 50%
Receitas de Hospedagem 1º ano R$ 238,896.00       
2º ano R$ 597,240.00       
3º ano R$ 1,194,480.00
4º ano em diante R$ 1,990,800.00
Receitas de Consumos
Bebidas 12% Receita Hospedagem
Outros (telefonia, lavanderia, etc) 3% Receita Hospedagem
Dimensionamento do Pessoal
Função Quant. Salário Mensal Total Mensal
Total Anual 
(14,33 x)
Gerente Geral 1 1,500.00           1,500.00           21,495.00         
governanta 1 700.00              700.00              10,031.00         
Arrumadeira 4 400.00              1,600.00           22,928.00         
Cozinheira 1 550.00              550.00              7,881.50           
Ajudante Cozinha 1 500.00              500.00              7,165.00           
Ajudante Cozinha 1 450.00              450.00              6,448.50           
Ajudante Cozinha 1 400.00              400.00              5,732.00           
Garçom 1 600.00              600.00              8,598.00           
Garçom 1 400.00              400.00              5,732.00           
Garçom 1 400.00              400.00              5,732.00           
Segurança 2 400.00              800.00              11,464.00         
Resp. fazenda e manutenção 1 800.00              800.00              11,464.00         
Serviços gerais 1 380.00              380.00              5,445.40           
Serviços gerais 1 380.00              380.00              5,445.40           
Serviços Gerais 1 380.00              380.00              5,445.40           
Total de Salários 19 9,840.00           141,007.20       
Encargos Trabalhistas 8% 787.20              11,280.58         
Contador 500.00              6,000.00           
Total de Gastos com Pessoal 11,127.20         158,287.78       
Premissas das Despesas Operacionais
Tributos:
Cofins % / Rec. Operacional Bruta 3.00%
PIS % / Rec. Operacional Bruta 0.65%
ISS % / Rec. Operac. Hosp. + Outros 3.00%
ICMS % / Rec. Operac. Bebidas 7.00%
Custos dos Serviços / Produtos Vendidos
Alimentação % / Rec. Operac. Hospedagem 15.00%
Bebidas % / Rec. Operac. Bebidas 30.00%
Outros (telefonia, lavanderia, etc) % / Rec. Operac. Outros 30.00%
Despesas Gerais
Vendas/Reservas/Marketing % / Rec. Operacional Bruta 2.00%
Água/Luz/Telefone/Internet % / Rec. Operacional Bruta 20.00%
Manutenção % / Rec. Operacional Bruta 2.00%
Diversos % / Rec. Operacional Bruta 2.00%
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Exhibit 35: Room Occupation Rates for 2006
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Exhibit 36: Room Occupancy Rates for 2007, as of June
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Exhibit 37: 2006 Occupancy Data
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Exhibit 38: Photographs of the Resort
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Exhibit 38, continued: Photographs of the Resort
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Exhibit 39: Photographs of the Construction Process
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Exhibit 40: Average Room Rate vs Occupancy Rate
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Exhibit 41: Competitive Resort Anticipated New Supply Estimate at 2007 - Bahia
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